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Cleaning up this Godforsaken mess will become the
political and moral struggle of our time.'
I. Introduction
The foregoing quotation does not refer to environmental issues,2 civil
rights concerns,3 the strains on our jurisprudential system, 4 or the AIDS
epidemic.' Instead, the "Godforsaken mess" is this country's system of
1. James H. Smalhout, The Not-So-Golden Years, WALL ST. J., June 29, 1995, at A14.
Mr. Smalhout has since authored his own book addressing shortcomings in the U.S. pension
insurance system. JAMES H. SMALHOUT, THE UNCERTAIN RETIEMENT: SECURING PENSION
PROMISES IN A WORLD OF RISK (1996); see also KAREN FERGUSON & KATE BLACKWELL,
PENSIONS IN CRISIS 216 (1995) ("Pension policy is at a crossroads. The old system has failed;
the new directions are as yet uncharted. It is now up to us to choose which road to take.");
CRAIG S. KARPEL, THE RTIREMENT MYTH 4 (1995) ("We're living in a time of global political
and technological change so swift and sweeping that yesterday's rational retirement plan has
become a parachute that won't open.").
2. See Bruce Babbitt, The Future Environmental Agenda for the United States, 64 U.
COLO. L. REv. 513, 514 (1993) ("The next generation of environmental challenges will be more
intractable, more difficult problems that fundamentally relate to how we live on the land and
on the planet.").
3. See Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Needfor an Effective Federal
Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1453, 1460 (1993)
("The problem of police abuse in urban America must be treated as a civil rights emergency,
requiring effective national, state and local action.").
4. See Steven A. Schultz, Note, In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos
Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged-A Proposal for the. Use of Federal Common Law in
Mass Tort Class Actions, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992) ("It has become increasingly
apparent in the last few years that the asbestos crisis facing the judicial system in the United
States has reached epidemic proportions.").
5. See Julie C. Relihan, Note, Expediting FDA Approval ofAIDS Drugs: An Interna-
tionalApproach, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229,229 (1995) ("Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) has evolved into a devastating global emergency that demands immediate attention from
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privately-sponsored employee benefit programs. Although others might argue
that their favorite social woe is more compelling, there is little question that
the economic issues associated with the aging of baby boomers, the largest
demographic group in the United States population,6 will raise significant
issues of domestic social policy. Such issues include intergenerational
conflict, the basic structure of federal entitlement programs, and the relative
responsibility of individual workers and their employers.
Problems are becoming particularly poignant as the oldest baby boomers
begin to reach their fifties. The projected effect of the baby boom cohort on
the current retirement income support system is staggering. Estimates indicate
that by the time the youngest of the boomers reach age sixty-five, 56.3% of
the federal budget will be devoted to Social Security, Medicare, and other
retirement programs.' According to the Bipartisan Commission on Entitle-
ment and Tax Reform, by 2012 "there will not be one cent left over for educa-
tion, children's programs, highways, national defense or any other discretion-
ary program. ' Optimistic demographic estimates indicate that life expectan-
cies are increasing by seventy-two days each year, while at the same time
fertility rates are dropping.9 Both factors contribute to the financial issues
confronting older Americans.
The problems of retiring boomers and, concomitantly, younger genera-
tions that may be forced to support them, are exacerbated by deficiencies in
the private pension system. The average "replacement rate" of a typical
defined benefit pension plan is only 22% of final salary after twenty years of
service. 0 The lack of inflation protection in most defined benefit pension
plans further contributes to the long term insufficiency of retirement income.
Additionally, as individuals continue to retire under early retirement programs
associated with corporate downsizing and as life expectancies increase, the
long term issues are becoming increasingly acute. Assuming a 4% inflation
rate, a pension benefit can lose 69% of its value over thirty years." The trend
toward defined contribution plans probably will not provide a solution for
retiring boomers. 12 As a result, some commentators and pension activists are
all comers of the world.").
6. See LouisEB. RUSSELL, THEBABYBOOMGENERATIONANDTHEECONOMY2 (1982).
But see WILLIAM STRAUSS &NEIL HOWE, GENERATIONS: THEHISTORY OF AMERICA'S FUTURE
36,395-96 (1991) (adopting generational counting method and arguing that 1961-81 population
is larger than 1943-60 population).
7. KARPEL, supra note 1, at 7.
8. Id. at 7-8.
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id. at 34.
11. Id
12. See id. at 34-37. The average lump sum distribution from a 401(k) plan is only
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advocating federal mandates requiring private employers to sponsor retirement
plans. 3
Even such a dramatic increase in the federal regulation of private em-
ployment arrangements would not be unprecedented. Federal regulation has
transformed workplace relationships in this country. Much of the early
legislation focused on the collective bargaining process, 4 child labor, wage
levels, and hours worked. 5 In response to other perceived problems, Con-
gress fashioned a patchwork of regulatory law which shaped various facets of
the employer-employee relationship. Concerns aboutjob security culminated
in many diverse obligations, such as notice requirements for plant closings'6
and guaranteed leaves of absence for the care of ill family members. 7 Biased
workplace practices resulted in federal prohibitions against employer discrimi-
nation directed toward varied classifications including race" and disability. 9
More obscure legislative efforts addressed employment of seamen on mer-
chant vessels,20 established support programs for displaced homemakers,2' and
limited the use of lie detector tests in the workplace.'
Perhaps nowhere has the federalization of a sphere of the employment
relationship been as extensive as in the arena of privately-sponsored employee
benefit programs. Beginning in 1974, Congress dramatically expanded fed-
eral regulation of the terms of employment arrangements when it passed the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).' With provi-
$11,154. Id. at44.
13. See, e.g., FERGUSON & BLACKWELL, supra note 1, at 205-16; Norman Stein, ERISA
and the Limits of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 110 (Winter 1993).
14. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)). Two major acts have amended the
Wagner Act. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act (LMRA), ch. 120, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994)); Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). For a summary of the origins and history of the NLRA, see
James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory
Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 948-65 (1996).
15. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676,52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)).
16. WorkerAdjustmentandRetrainingNotificationAct, 29U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1994).
17. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
18. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-(q) (1994).
19. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
20. Shipping, 46 U.S.C. §§ 10,101-11,112 (1994).
21. Displaced Homemakers Self-Sufficiency Assistance Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2314
(1994).
22. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994).
23. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §§ 1-4402, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1994).
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sions affecting pension programs, almost all categories ofnoncash compensa-
tion,24 and some categories of cash compensation,' ERISA altered the legal
landscape for employer and employee relationships. At the time of its
passage, commentators gave mixed reviews to the new legislation. Some
hailed ERISA as the solution26 to inadequate and unenforceable employer-
sponsored deferred and noncash compensation programs. 7 Others were
skeptical about the capacity of such reticulated federal legislation to provide
efficient and equitable solutions to the myriad plans regulated by ERISA. s
ERISA was unique in the way it attempted to balance increased regulation
with a system of voluntary plan sponsorship.29
Two decades of experience indicate that portions of the statute have
achieved the relevant congressional goals.3" In addition to its successes, how-
ever, the federal regulation of employer-sponsored benefit programs has also
24. See id § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
25. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(m) (1994) (limiting deductible cash compensation to one mil-
lion dollars).
26. See Robert L. Fischer & Marc H. Berger, A New Tax Benefit-IndividualRetirement
Plans Under the '74 Act, 6 TAx ADvIsER 215, 215 (1975) (noting that tax accountants are
hailing increased tax advantages available underERISA); G. Waldron Snyder, Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 219,226 (1975) (calling ERISA
"sophisticated effort to improve the [private benefit] system without depriving it of its vitality
and health"); Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Development ofthe New Pension Reform Laws, 26 LAB.
L.J. 135, 135 (1975) (calling ERISA "milestone in the development of labor-management
relations"); Kay G. Finley & Merritt A. Gardner, Note, The Pension Reform Act of1974: Brave
New World of Retirement Security, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 1044, 1083 (1975) (calling ERISA "a
noble piece of legislation"); see also 120 CONG. REC. 29,935 (1974) (statement of Sen.
Williams) ("[A] pension reform law is now a reality because of the hardship, deprivation and
inequity suffered by American working people.... The discipline of law will enable this and
succeeding generations of workers to face their retirement period with greater confidence and
greater security .... ).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 109-12 for a discussion of the termination of
Studebaker Corp.'s pension program, which many agree was a primary factor in initiating the
congressional hearings that ultimately led to the enactment of ERISA.
28. See, e.g., R. Michael Sanchez et al., The Pension Reform Act of 1974: Fiduciary
Responsibility and Prohibited Transactions (Part 1), 6 TAX ADVISER 86, 98 (1975) ("T]he
complexity of the statute and the myriad of detailed rules demonstrate once again that this part
of the Act is an example of classic bureaucratic overkill .... [The Act threatens to strangle
the very structure it is intended to safeguard - namely private employee benefit plans."); Win-
throp D. Thies, How Most Nearly to Enjoy "Pension Reform," 113 TR. & EST. 564,609 (1974)
("The new proposed legislation, in addition.., to increasing pension costs and liabilities, which
may serve to give many American workers ultimately less rather than more, largely crams each
employer into a Procrustean bed as to pensions.").
29. See infra text accompanying notes 459-61.
30. See, e.g., Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:
The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. C. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1988) (noting success of reporting
and disclosure obligations and vesting provisions).
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been attacked on several fronts.31 The recent prominence accorded to the
debate over national health care reform32 highlights one of the more notable
challenges still facing federal regulators. On the pension side of the equation,
prognosticators of forthcoming problems in retirement security usually focus
on the aging baby boom population33 as the straw that may break this camel's
back. 4
This Article looks to theory underlying the development of United States
social policy in order to inform the analysis of regulatory and jurisprudential
challenges that flow from the current patterns of private benefit plan
programs. Part II opens with a discussion of contemporary social welfare
reform theory, focusing on the work of Professor Theda Skocpol 5 It then
integrates Professor Skocpol's theoretical work with the unique paradigm of
employer-sponsored benefit programs that has developed in the United
States.36 Part III explains how ERISA's broad preemptive force intersects
with its narrowly construed substantive provisions to create regulatory voids
that undermine the security of current benefit promises.37 In order to sharpen
the overall discussion, Part IV examines two specific areas where benefits
jurisprudence receives particularly heavy criticism.3 Part LV.A concentrates
on health care plans and considers the enforceability of misstatements or
misrepresentations of health care benefit entitlements. 9 Part IV.B turns to the
pension context and examines the pension entitlements of employees and
benefit plan trustees who engage in wrongdoing.4"
31. See, e.g., id. at 1105-07 (citing as problems ERISA's preemption, multi-employer,
insurance, and fiduciary provisions).
32. The Clinton administration's proposed reform measure was introduced to Congress
as the Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 1757, 103d Cong. (1993). Com-
peting proposals included: Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act of 1993, H.R. 3704,
103d Cong. (1993); S. 1770, 103d Cong. (1993); Managed Competition Act of 1993, H.R.
3222, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 1579, 103d Cong. (1993); American Health Security Act of 1993,
H.R. 1200, 103d Cong. (1993); S. 491, 103d Cong. (1993).
33. The usual definition of the baby boom generation includes those born between 1946
and 1964. See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 6, at 1.
34. See, e.g., KARPEL, supra note 1, at 1-5.
35. See generally, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1992) [hereinafter SKOCPOL,
SOCIAL POLICY]; see also THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON'SHEALTHSECURTYEFFORT
AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS (1996); THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1995);
THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS IN THEMODERN WORLD (1994); infra Part II.
36. See infra Part II.
37. See infra Part III.
38. See infra Part IV.
39. See infra Part IV.A.
40. See infra Part IV.B.
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One prominent commentator, Professor Norman Stein, asserts that many
of the jurisprudential difficulties are attributable to the central ERISA
compromise and are unavoidable results of our system of voluntary plan spon-
sorship.4 Part V argues that the narrow construction accorded to ERISA's
provisions is reminiscent of thirteenth century England's system of writs,
which even excluded claims evidencing a clear injury if they did not fit within
the narrow paradigm of an established writ.42 A substantial factor in the
inequities and inefficiencies found in benefits jurisprudence has been reliance
on narrow and overly formalistic analysis.43 As an alternative framework, the
interest analysis approach, advocated by Professors Daniel Fischel and John
Langbein in their seminal article on fiduciary duty jurisprudence,4 should be
extended to the broader array of employer-sponsored welfare and retirement
income plan issues. This Article concludes by illustrating how use of the
Fischel and Langbein interest analysis accords with and gives substance to the
basic compromise of ERISA.4"
I. United States Social Policy and the Development of
Privately Sponsored Benefit Programs
A. Early Efforts at Federal Support Programs
In her seminal work, Protecting Soldiers andMothers," Professor Skoc-
pol challenges the widely accepted notion47 that the study of United States
41. Stein, supra note 13, at 73-81.
42. See infra Part V.
43. See infra notes 421-30 and accompanying text (discussing problems with benefits
jurisprudence).
44. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 30, at 1105.
45. See infra Part V.
46. SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 35, at 100-03.
47. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Private Provision of Unemployment Insurance, 1992
Wis. L. REv. 61, 127 ("Historically, it is generally believed, as to both UI [unemployment
insurance] and social insurance generally, that before the New Deal the government more or less
followed a laissez faire policy as to social insurance, that private insurance failed to adequately
develop, and therefore that government insurance was necessary."); Richard B. Stewart,
Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CMI. L. REV. 335, 337 (1990) ("The New Deal also produced the
first wave of large-scale national social insurance and welfare programs, including the social
security and unemployment systems."); Susan L. Waysdorf, Fightingfor Their Lives: Women,
Poverty, and the Historical Role of United States Law in Shaping Access to Women's Health
Care, 84 KY. L.J. 745, 805 (1996) ("From an historical perspective, the Social Security Act of
1935 was a massive, omnibus, New Deal legislative vehicle which was the first manifestation
of the expanding federal role in social welfare. As a result, the... Act... would become the
basis for what some critics call the 'welfare state' ...... "); Neal Devins, Government Lawyers
and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 242 (1996) (book review) ("FDR's New Deal
promised nothing less than a social revolution.").
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social welfare programs should begin with the New Deal era and legislation
such as the Social Security Act of 1935.48 Instead, Professor Skocpol concen-
trates on the period beginning in the 1860s and continuing through the early
1900s when Congress sponsored and funded increasingly generous pension
and disability benefits for Civil War veterans and their dependents. 9 Pro-
fessor Skocpol considers whether the effect of advocacy groups or the import
of high revenues from protective tariffs explains the development and expan-
sion of Civil War pensions. Ultimately, she rejects both theories as insuf-
ficient explanations." Instead, Professor Skocpol looks to the structure and
organization of the United States political system, including the judiciary, to
account for the generous early retirement and disability benefits for veterans
and their dependents. 1
In the early stages of the Civil War, benefits were outgrowths of limited
existing entitlement programs for veterans and were used as a recruiting
measure.' Professor Skocpol traces the growth of those benefits, both in
amount and in scope of coverage, to Republican political efforts.53 Overtime
the program increased substantially in its complexity, both in terms of
eligibility determinations and in calculation of awards.' The intricacies led
to substantial discretion on the part of the United States Pension Bureau,
which administered the program, and, atthe time, was calledthe "largest exec-
utive bureau in the world."55 Given the size, scope, and abstruse nature of the
Civil War pension program, some fraud and corruption was inevitable. Hard
data are impossible to obtain, but some commentators have alleged that
politicization of and discretion in the Civil War programs ultimately led to
more than 25% of all approved benefit applications being fraudulent in some
way.
56
According to Professor Skocpol, the perceived corruption and adminis-
trative incompetence associated with the Civil War pension system provided
powerful arguments against subsequent social reform efforts.57 By extension,
48. Social Security Act, ch. 531,49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1397(e) (1994)).
49. SKOOPOL, SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 35, at 100-03.
50. Id. at 102-10.
51. Id. at 102-30.
52. Id. at 106-24.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 120 (quoting Green B. Raum, Pensions and Patriotism, 153 N. AM. REV. 211,
215 (1891)). Professor Skocpol points out the inaccuracy of this statement. Id. at 590 n.64
(noting larger size of Department of Public Works in New South Wales).
56. Id. at 143-45.
57. Id. at 532-33.
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this theory regarding the development of and eventual problems with the
Civil War pension system helps explain the failure of subsequent efforts
to grant pension coverage benefitting the broader United States working
population. Attempts to enact other employment-focused regulation, such as
wage and hour statutes and health care coverage, also met with limited
success.58 During the late 1800s and early 1900s, some western European
countries instituted governmental programs in these areas and extended
coverage, at relatively minimal levels, to broad segments of the population.59
In contrast, restrictive United States programs followed the structure and
theory of the Civil War pension system by providing proportionally generous
benefits for those whose actions, rather than financial circumstances or
general employment records, were deemed worthy of social recognition and
support.'
According to Skocpol's analysis, another factor affecting the divergence
between western European and United States social welfare programs was the
difference in their respective political institutions.6" For example, Britain
developed a professional civil service and, thus, the capability of administer-
ing social programs in a reasonably efficient and unbiased manner. The
British civil service attracted and employed individuals whose expertise and
advocacy supported the extension of social welfare benefits, both in terms of
the types of benefits offered and the scope of coverage.62 Additionally, the
existence ofa professional civil service led the political parties to advocate the
extension of programs to various voting cohorts.63
In contrast, organizational and competitive forces of the United States
political system led to Republican sponsorship of comparatively generous but
narrowly targeted social benefits for those who provided critical political
support to Republican electoral victories." At the same time, this focus and
use of fiscal resources contributed to the rejection of social support programs
based upon need.65 The United States public viewed this patronage-based
administrative system with suspicion, further undercutting public support for
social programs.' Critics of governmental programs pointed to the fraud and
incompetence that developed in the administration of the Civil War pension
58. See id. at 253-61, 525.
59. Seeid. at 131.
60. Id. at 130-51.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 135-51.
63. Id. at 249-53.
64. Idat 120-29.
65. Id. at 120-30.
66. Id.
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system. 7 This was offered as an example of the corruption and spending
excess that could be found in such extensive social support legislation,
especially given the perceived lack of a reliable administrative system. In
addition, the courts' use of constitutional principles to void the social welfare
legislation that passed public and legislative scrutiny dealt the final blow to
the extension of broad based protective legislation for the United States
working population. 9
B. Rise of Private Employer Programs as an Alternative
Because, unlike the western European nations, the United States did not
develop federally-sponsored social support programs that extended pension
insurance to broad classes of workers, the United States pension system
developed privately as the nation industrialized. Even prior to the develop-
ment of formal private pension plans, some employers provided income to
superannuated workers by transferring them to less physically demanding
work, giving them a monetary "gift" when they terminated employment, or
even making small, periodic payments that resembled what today would be
recognized as a pension." However, the arrangements were informal and the
employers who chose to provide some income to their aged workers retained
discretion over the provision of those benefits."
The American Express Company' generally receives credit for being
the first employer to establish a formal private pension plan in the United
States; it began its plan in 1875.' During the closing years of the 1800s and
the early 1900s, a few other companies established pension programs for their
67. Id. at 260-63.
68. Id. at 261-63.
69. Id. at 254-61.
70. NATIONAL INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., INC., INDUSTRIAL PENSIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 41-47 (1925).
71. Id. at 42-43.
72. See NATIONAL PLANNING ASS'N, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PENSIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 11 (Comm. Print 1952). The committee print wrongly implies that the American
Express Company, which was first in providing pension plans, is unrelated to the current
American Express Company. The two companies are one and the same. See PETER Z.
GROSSMAN, AMERICAN EXPRESS: THE UNOFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE WHO BUILT THE
GREAT FINANCIAL EMPIRE 145 (1987); ALDEN HATCH, AMERICAN EXPRESS: A CENTURY OF
SERVICE 89 (1950).
73. NATIONAL PLANNING ASS'N, PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 11; see also
ROBERT L. CLARK & ANN A. MCDERmED, THE CHOICE OF PENSION PLANS IN A CHANGING
REGULATORY ENvIRONMENT 64 (1990); WILLIAM C. GREENOUGH & FRANCIS P. KING,
PENSION PLANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 27 (1976); Camilla E. Watson, Broken Promises
Revisited: The Window of Vulnerability for Surviving Spouses Under ERISA, 76 IOWA L. REV.
431,440 (1991).
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employees.74 The concept of company-sponsored pension plans then began
to spread more quickly, and by 1929 formal pension plans covered approx-
imately 14.4% of the nonagricultural workforce.75 Consistentwith contempo-
rary social welfare theory,' many employers remained generally hostile to the
idea of dependable benefit promises, viewing such commitments as contradic-
tory to notions of thrift, self-responsibility, and proper work ethic." Private
pension plan growth spurted again between 1940, when 4.1 million workers
were covered, and 1960, when 18.7 million workers, almost 41% of the
workforce, enjoyed pension coverage.78
A variety of demographic, sociological, and regulatory factors converged
to explain the demand for and the resulting rapid growth of pension and other
benefit plan coverage. Employment opportunities decreased for individuals
past age sixty-five.79 A contemporaneous government report attributed the
drop in employment, from 68% of all men aged sixty-five and older in 1890
to 42% in 1952, to a decrease in self-employed occupations, especially agri-
culture.80 Life-spans increased while family size decreased." As elderly
individuals became less likely to reside with their children or to depend on
their children for financial support, 2 the need for pension and health care
programs increased. Yet, governmental programs remained limited due to
public skepticism and court invalidation,83 so it seems logical that plan growth
occurred in the private sector.
Pressure for private sector plan development and sponsorship increased
when employers competed for scarce labor during World War II. Although
federal regulation limited the availability of salary and wage increases, 4 it
74. NATIONAL PLANNINGASS'N, PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES I I (citing Consolidated
Gas Co. of New York in 1892, Carnegie Steel in 1901, and Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey) in
1903); CLARK &MCDERMED, supra note 73, at 64 (citing Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company
in 1880).
75. CLARK & MCDERMED, supra note 73, at 64.
76. See supra Part I.A.
77. NATIONAL INDUS. CONFERENCE BD., supra note 70, at 43-44.
78. Id. at 66.
79. NATIONAL PLANNING Ass'N, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
4-5 (Comm. Print 1952).
80. NATIONAL PLANNING ASS'N, 82D CONG., 2D SESS., PENSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
4-5 (Comm. Print 1952); see also DAN M. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 2-3
2d ed. 1964).
81. NATIONAL PLANNINGASs'N, PENSIONS INTHEUNTED STATES 6; McGILL, supra note
80, at 2.
82. NATIONAL PLANNINGASS'N, PENSIONS INTHEUNTED STATES 6; MCGILL, supra note
80, at 5.
83. See supra Part II.A.
84. NATIONALPLANNINGASS'N, PENSIONS INTHEUNITED STATES 11; JOSEPH SCHWARTZ,
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permitted employers to modify health care and pension plans. In the immed-
iate post-World War II years, the continuing labor shortage and high corporate
tax rates encouraged the growth of benefit program sponsorship as employers
used tax subsidized noncash compensation programs to compete for
employees.85 Other factors sometimes cited as influencing private sponsor-
ship of deferred and noncash compensation plans include the bargaining
policy goals of labor unions and court decisions upholding retirement benefits
as a mandatory subject for collective bargaining."6
The formalized plans adopted by employers during this period were very
different on their surface from earlier informal plans. The new plans typically
purported to cover most, if not all, of an employer's workers instead of being
reserved for a small cadre of favored executives. Also, the plans frequently
established formulae for calculating pension benefits or provided for the pur-
chase of indemnity coverage inthe case of medical insurance programs.8 7 How-
ever, much of the perceived progress proved illusory because new plans often
contained onerous vesting requirements that few individuals could meet.8
One study published in 1960 found that more than 25% of all plans surveyed
provided for vesting only at actual retirement. 9 As the next section discusses,
even as employers formalized benefit plans, the law typically continued to
view the plans as gratuitous arrangements, revocable at the will of employers.
C. Regulation of the Early Programs
Given the skepticism during this era about governmental involvement
with pension and other similar social welfare programs, it should not be sur-
prising that legislative and common law enforcement of benefit expectations
began slowly. The earliest explicit federal regulation affecting privately-
sponsored benefit plans came with the enactment of the federal income tax
in 1913. 0 The following year, the Treasury Department confirmed the right
of employers to deduct, as compensation, the cost of pension payments.9'
IN PENSIONS WE TRUST 5 (1949); see also CLARK & MCDERMED, supra note 73, at 70; Sar A.
Levitan, Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 9 LAB. L.J. 827, 827-28 (1958).
85. William J. Isaacson, Employee Welfare and Pension Plans: Regulation and Protec-
tion of Employee Rights, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 96,98 (1959).
86. Watson, supra note 73, at 442.
87. See Isaacson, supra note 85, at 98-101.
88. See CLARK&MCDERMED, supra note 73, at 66; NATIoNAL INDUS. CONFERENCEBD.,
INC., supra note 70, at 68-84; EDWIN W. PATrERSON, LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PENSION
EXPECTATIONS 60-64 (1960).
89. PATr ON, supra note 88, at 61.
90. CLARK & MCDERMED, supra note 73, at 67.
91. Id.
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Then, in 1942, Congress added to the Internal Revenue Code the first pro-
visions limiting a benefit plan's ability to discriminate in the provision of
benefits.'
Even in the private sector, administrative challenges increased as the
number and assets of benefit plans grew. As with federal administration of
the Civil War pension program,93 problems arose with corruption and inepti-
tude in plan administration and investment.94 Although most pension plan
assets were held through bank trust indentures, the limited responsibilities
delegated to the bank trustees meant that neither federal nor state banking
laws were effective in curbing plan abuses.' Similarly, state insurance law
was ill-equipped to deal with the rapidly expanding employer-sponsored
health and life insurance programs.9" Thus, it appeared that the legal doctrines
most applicable to the new breed of employee benefit plans would be found
in the common law of trusts or contracts.
Not surprisingly, the fiduciary concepts of trust law were extended to
pension plan assets. 97 Trust law, however, did not easily adapt to challenges
posed by the diverse loyalties of employers acting both as plan sponsors and
trust administrators. Furthermore, delegation of fiduciary duties, the charita-
ble characterization accorded some benefit trusts causing them to be viewed
as gratuitous arrangements, and procedural issues posed new problems for
trust law." None of these benefit plan characteristics fit within the paradigm
of a testamentary transfer. Traditional fiduciary doctrine, therefore, supplied
an incomplete and ill-fitting framework for the analysis of developing benefit
plan issues.
Contract doctrine offered an alternative conceptual framework for the
legal problems that began to crop up as benefit plan sponsorship expanded.
Courts determined that plans developed and funded solely by employers had
92. Id. at 68-69; PATrERSON, supra note 88, at 85-88. In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act
added labor law provisions that, in part, prohibit unions from diverting contributions made to
union pension plans or to pension plans jointly sponsored by unions and employers. Labor
ManagementRelations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 302,61 Stat. 136, 157 (1947) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 186 (1994)).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
94. BENJAMIN AARON, LEGAL STATUS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RiGHTs UNDER PRIVATE
PENSION PLANs 100 (1961); JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSiON AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 67-68 (1995); Isaacson, supra note 85, at 101-05.
95. Isaacson, supra note 85, at 107.
96. Id. at 107-08.
97. Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 909,
922-23 (1970).
98. Isaacson, supra note 85, at 108-09; Stein, supra note 13, at73-81;Note, LegalProb-
lems of Private Pension Plans, 70 HARV. L. REv. 490,498 (1957).
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elements of unilateral contracts, while they sometimes viewed certain negoti-
ated and contributory plans as bilateral contracts.99 When benefit promises
did not rise to the level of enforceable contracts, often due to a lack of con-
sideration, courts sometimes applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel to
ensure employees' expectations were met." Still, claimants faced hurdles
such as standing and the limitations of third-party beneficiary theory,'0 ' as
well as questions regarding which company officers had authority to make
binding benefit promises. 2 To the extent that courts continued to view retire-
ment and health care plans as gratuities which conferred few, if any,
enforceable rights on workers, most established contract law principles were
simply inapplicable.0 3
Thus, although state common law doctrines of trust and contract had
some limited application to benefit plan issues, by 1958 the lack of any
effective statutory or common law regime was clear. Yet, just six states had
enacted specific legislation to regulate private benefit programs." As a
result, the regulatory focus began to shift to the federal level. In 1958 Con-
gress enacted the Federal Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act (WPPDA),
in response to continuing abuses connected with benefit plans and the lack of
effective federal or state regulation. 5 Even in this legislation, one can
observe a reluctance to involve any federal administrative body in actively
combating various improprieties. The legislation did not establish an active
governmental role in auditing plans or actively enforcing benefit promises.
Instead, the WPPDA attempted to address problems by mandating disclosure
of plan terms and investments to participants in deferred and noncash
compensation plans and to the Department of Labor (DOL)."es The goal of the
99. West v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 225 P.2d 978, 983 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); Note, supra note
97, at 917-18.
100. West, 225 P.2d at 983; Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807, 815-16 (Cal. Ct. App.
1948); Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 167-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (per curiam);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 illus. 2 (1932); Note, supra note 97, at 920-21.
101. See Hughes v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 117 N.E.2d 880, 881 (II. App. Ct.
1954); Note, supra note 97, at 921.
102. See Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357,370 (2d Cir. 1959); Langer v. Superior Steel
Corp., 178 A. 490, 491 (Pa. 1935).
103. See Hughes, 117 N.E.2d at 882; Kravitz v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 160
N.Y.S.2d 716,720 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957). But see Hunter v. Sparling, 197 P.2d 807, 814 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1948) (determining that pensions are compensation for services rendered and not mere
gratuities).
104. See Isaacson, supra note 85, at 110 (noting that only Washington, Wisconsin, Cali-
fornia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York had enacted regulatory legislative programs
for private benefit systems); Levitan, supra note 84, at 830.
105. Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-836,72 Stat. 997, repealed by ERISA, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, § 111(a)(1), 88 Stat. 829, 851.
106. AARON, supra note 94, at 103-08; CLARK & MCDERMD, supra note 73, at 69;
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WPPDA was to ensure that participants received sufficient information to
police benefit programs in which they participated. 7
In spite of these legislative attempts to protect the plan interests of
workers, problems remained. Stringent vesting rules continued to prevent
even individuals with long service from gaining entitlement to benefits.'
Furthermore, workers with vested rights could still be forced to forfeit their
expected benefits if a plan terminated without providing adequate funding for
benefits. In one such situation in the 1960s, often pointed to as the genesis of
the congressional hearings that, in turn, led to the enactment of ERISA,0 9
Studebaker Corporation declared bankruptcy and closed its automobile plant
in South Bend, Indiana. Because the Studebaker pension plan was under-
funded, 6,900 employees lost some or all oftheirpromised pension benefits."0
The United Auto Workers and Studebaker privately negotiated the distribution
of the inadequate plan assets and agreed to favor retirees over those who
remained employed until the plant closed."' As a result, a fifty-nine year-old
who had not retired received 15% of his vested pension benefit, while a sixty
year-old who had retired received her full vested benefit."'
Congress responded to the continuing unreliability of benefit plan prom-
ises, as evidenced by incidents such as the underfunded termination of the
Studebaker plan, by enacting ERISA in 1974. Title I of ERISA addresses
many coverage problems perceived to exist with employer plans."3 ERISA's
vesting and accrual requirements have been lauded as a successful way to
combat the illusory nature of many of the early pension promises." 4 Title I
of ERISA also contains a melange of other provisions governing the
establishment and administration of privately-sponsored employee benefit
LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 94, at 68-69.
107. See AARON, supra note 94, at 103; Isaacson, supra note 85, at 121.
108. 119 CoNG. REc. 30,003 (1973), reprinted in SENATE SUBCOMMITEE ON LABOR OF
THE COMMITTEEONLABORAND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE EMPLOYEE RETmEmENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 1599 (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter HISTORY] ("[T]wo-thirds of all pension plan participants... have no vested right
in their plan."). For example, because the pension plan of Raybestos Corp. provided for vesting
only at retirement, the closing of its New Jersey plant caused 900 employees to forfeit their
expected pension benefits. Id.
109. See, e.g., LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 94, at 62-67.
110. Private Pension Plans: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fiscal Policy of the Joint
Economic Comm., 89th Cong. 103-28 (1966) (statement of Clifford M. MacMillan, Vice
President, Studebaker Corp.).
111. SMALHOUT, supra note 1, at 8-9.
112. See 120 CONG. REC. 4279 (1974), reprinted in HISTORY, supra note 108, at 3373.
113. See ERISA §§ 201-11,29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (1994) (establishing requirements for
nonforfeitability and form of payment).
114. See, e.g., Fischel & Langbein, supra note 30, at 1105.
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plans."' In accordance with the history of federal benefit regulation dating
back to the WPPDA,116 a number of these requirements relate to reporting and
disclosure. 7 Among other things, the statute requires that all benefit plans
be memorialized in a written document and that amendments to the plan
follow the plan's explicit amendment procedure."'
To meet the problem of unfunded benefit plan promises, the statute set
forth specific funding requirements for pension plans." 9 As an additional
measure, ERISA provided for the creation of an insurance program to be run
by a new federal corporation, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC). 2° In theory, the insurance program protects the benefits of partici-
pants in certain types of pension plans from the eventuality that their pension
plan will contain too few assets to pay their benefits at a time when their
employer is unable to make the contributions necessary to fund the plan.'
As Part IV.B of this Article discusses in detail, ERISA also contains an anti-
alienation provision intended to ensure that plan beneficiaries do not pledge
or otherwise prespend their retirement income."2
In contrast to the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),'" which
contains little explicit direction regarding preemption, ERISA contains a
broad preemption provision. 4 Still, some very specific exemptions from
federalization exist."2 ERISA's "savings clause"'26 establishes an exemption
115. For a brief overview of the contents of ERISA's four titles, see DanaM. Muir, Plant
Closings and ERISA 's Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L. REV. 201,203-05 (1995).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
117. ERISA §§ 101-111, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994).
118. Id. §402,29U.S.C.§ 1102.
119. Id. §§ 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086; I.R.C. §§ 412, 4971 (1996).
120. ERISA § 4002(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
121. For one explanation of the potential problems facing the pension insurance system,
as well as a suggested alternative system, see generally SMALHOuT, supra note 1.
122. See ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A) requires
qualified pension benefit plans to provide parallel protections. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13)(A). This
Article generally follows the courts' terminology by referring to both provisions collectively as
"ERISA's anti-alienation provision" or "the anti-alienation provision."
123. Labor Management Relations (Taft Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1994)).
124. ERISA § 514,29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994).
125. One specific exemption permits Hawaii to provide for universal health care within the
state. Id. § 514 (b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(5). For more information on the "Hawaii excep-
tion," including a discussion of the case law and legislative history of the exception, see David
Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48
U. Pirr. L. REv. 427, 474-75 (1987).
126. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987), superseded by
statute as stated in Hunter v. Ameritech, 779 F. Supp. 419, 421 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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from preemption for insurance, banking, and securities.'2 7 Before ERISA's
enactment, states were beginning to apply their general insurance regulation
to self-funded employer-sponsored health care plans. For example, Missouri
fined Monsanto Company $185 million for its failure to obtain the proper
insurance licensing for its medical care plan.' Courts have referred to these
state actions as the genesis for ERISA's "deemer clause,"'2 which limits the
savings clause and provides that employee benefit plans and trusts shall not
be deemed to be institutions that would be regulated by state insurance,
banking, or securities laws. 30
With ERISA implemented, it appeared that employees finally would
achieve some degree of security in employer-sponsored benefit plans. There
was some expectation that ERISA would change the rules of the game because
ERISA no longer permitted the earliest types of plans where employers
maintained full discretion over entitlement. It also contrasted with the second
generation of plans, which purported to cover large groups of employees but
failed to provide actual benefits in most cases because of stringent vesting
rules or a lack of funds. Under ERISA employers retained decisional power
over benefit plan sponsorship.' But, once made, their voluntary promises of
benefits would be increasingly enforceable.'32
III. Of Black Holes and Benefit Plan Jurisprudence
Federalization of the law governing employer-sponsored benefit pro-
grams is attributable to ERISA's extraordinarily broad preemption clause.
The next Subpart will sketch the scope of ERISA preemption. The second
Subpart focuses on ERISA's substantive and remedial jurisprudence. Al-
though frequently viewed as disparate sets of normative rules, the intersection
of preemption and substantive jurisprudence affects both plan sponsorship
decisions and the enforceability of benefit promises. The results generate
policy repercussions for the baby boomers and succeeding generations.
A. The Preemption Black Hole
Except for the explicit exemptions,'33 ERISA provides for the preemption
of "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
127. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
128. Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WAsH. U. L.Q. 619, 648
(1994).
129. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 45.
130. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
131. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).
132. See ERISA § 2,29 U.S.C. § 1001.
133. See supra note 125.
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employee benefit plan." '134 On its face, the rather detailed preemption provi-
sion appears carefully crafted. However, consistent with Professor Skocpol's
theory that governmental institutions affect social policy, the legislative
history undergirding this provision reflects the unique political climate that
existed during the final stages of ERISA's enactment. President Ford signed
the legislation on Labor Day, 1974.' Prior to Nixon's resignation, the
Watergate controversy had captured the attention of both the nation and Con-
gress." 6 One legitimately can wonder how Congress's preoccupation with
Watergate affected its attention to and enactment of ERISA. It appears plausi-
ble, at least for some of the heavily debated provisions, that the extensive
consideration Congress gave to pension reform over the prior ten years offset
any distraction caused by Watergate. 37
Nevertheless, the language of the preemption provision can be traced
only to the Conference Committee, which negotiated the final, compromise
version of the legislation. 38 Prior drafts of the legislation limited preemption
to itemized issues addressed by ERISA or to subject matters covered by
ERISA.'39 The Supreme Court repeatedly has pointed to the threat of
inconsistent state regulation in the benefits arena as the explanation for the
broadly drafted preemption provision.14 ° This concern, which the Supreme
Court traces to ERISA's legislative history, would have been consistent with
the increasing patchwork of benefit program regulation promulgated by the
states. 4 ' There also was hope that the broad preemption provision would
limit preemption litigation.'42 The unprecedented breadth of the preemption
provision inspired uncertainty in its creators, and the legislation called for a
task force to evaluate the appropriate scope of preemption and to make recom-
134. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Another subsection broadly defines "State
laws" to include "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect
of law, of any State." ERISA § 514(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(I).
135. ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE V (1997).
136. See Gregory, supra note 125, at 456.
137. Id.
138. See Conison, supra note 128, at 619.
139. Id.
140. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 64-65 (1990); Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46
(1987), superceded by statute as stated in Hunter v. Ameritech, 779 F. Supp. 419, 421 (N.D.
Ill. 1991); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 746 n.24 (1985); Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 99 (1983).
141. See supra text accompanying note 128 (regarding application of state insurance
regulation).
142. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974).
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mendations for any necessary modifications. 14 No task force ever completed
such an evaluation.'"
ERISA's preemption provision is unique in the realm of federal employ-
ment legislation. The LMRA is almost totally silent on the question of
preemption. Yet; the Supreme Court has construed the LMRA as preempting
most related state regulation. 45 At the other end of the spectrum, the federal
antidiscrimination statutes typically establish minimum protections but
explicitly permit most state regulation in the field.146 This has left the states
free to experiment with employment-related regulation, an opportunity they
have not wasted. In the nondiscrimination arena, many state and local statutes
prohibit a broader array of employer conduct and offer stronger remedies than
the federal statutes. 47
Not surprisingly given the broad wording of the statute, ERISA's
preemptive effect has been broader even than that of the LMRA. In its second
decision to address ERISA preemption, 4 ' the Supreme Court made two
specific statements integral to the development of preemption jurisprudence.
The Court stated that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the
normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan."149 Standing alone, the "connection with or reference to" language
provides little in the way of limitation. For example, this formulation
arguably is broad enough to encompass state tort calculations that refer to
benefit plans for damage determinations. However, the Court provided some
guidance on the contours of the "connection with or reference to" test when
it opined that a state law or action may be "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral"
to meet the "relates to" test.
50
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions have refined the "connection with
or reference to" analysis, essentially establishing a bifurcated test. In its 1997
decision in California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dilling-
143. Conison, supra note 128, at 650-51; Leon E. Irish & Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA
Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 109, 114
(1985).
144. Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Intersection ofState Corporation Law and
Employee Compensation Programs: Is It Curtains for Veil Piercing?, 1996 U. ILL. L. Rav.
1059, 1073.
145. See Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
469,560-94 (1993).
146. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1994).
147. See Drummonds, supra note 145, at 496-502.
148. The first discussion occurred inAlessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504,
521-26 (1981).
149. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
150. Id.atlOOn.21.
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ham Construction,15 1 the'Court indicated that a state law will fail the "refer-
ence to" prong of the test where the law "acts immediately and exclusively
upon ERISA plans... or where the existence of such plans is essential to its
operation."'52 Application of the "connection with" prong of the test has
proven more difficult to explicate. Recent decisions indicate that two con-
siderations are critical in this determination. First, one must evaluate "the
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of the state law that
Congress understood would survive." ' The second determinant is the
"nature of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.""lM Under the "connec-
tion with" analysis, the Court indicated that ERISA may preempt statutes even
if these statutes are consistent with national benefit plan policy, 5' have only
an indirect effect on privately sponsored benefit programs, and have no spe-
cific intent to affect benefit plans.5 6
Under current preemptionjurisprudence, state regulation explicitly refer-
encing an employee benefit plan likely will fall prey to ERISA's preemption
provision. Furthermore, the provision's broad language has been construed
to void state laws having a connection with an employee benefit plan.57 In
spite of the limitations on preemption imposed by the "tenuous, remote, or
peripheral" standard,' ERISA's preemption clause federalized a vast array
of state law that touched upon privately-sponsored deferred and noncash
compensation programs.'59 The range of state statutes nullified in their
application to employee benefit plan matters extends from garnishment 16 to
unjust discharge.161 The complexity, 62 breadth, 63 and quantity' 64 of ERISA
151. 117 S. Ct. 832(1997).
152. CaliforniaDiv. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,N.A., 117 S.
Ct. 832, 834 (1997).
153. New York State Conference of Blue Cross& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995).
154. California Div. ofLabor Standards Enforcement, 117 S. Ct. at 838.
155. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724,739 (1985).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987), superceded
by statute as stated in Hunter v. Ameritech, 779 F. Supp. 419, 421 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
158. See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S. Ct.
at 1683 (upholding New York state statute that imposed surcharges on certain insurance plans,
thereby affecting rates paid by employer-sponsored health insurance plans). For a more detailed
analysis of current ERISA preemption jurisprudence, see Muir & Schipani, supra note 144, at
1114-19.
159. See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans, 115 S.Ct.
at 1671 (listing cases where Supreme Court has found state law to be preempted).
160. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825,828-29 (1988).
161. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142-43 (1990).
162. See Jordan v. Reliable Life Ins. Co., 694 F. Supp. 822, 827 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (refer-
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preemption jurisprudence has drawn substantial criticism from courts and
commentators alike, with commentators comparing ERISA preemption to a
"black hole."'65
B. The Substantive and Remedial Black Holes
Once swept into the federal sphere by preemption, some employee bene-
fit plan issues become consigned to a void - the so called "black hole" of
ERISA. That void results from a lack of federal standing, an absence of any
available relief, or an inability to state a claim within the narrow parameters
prescribed by the statute. 66 It is here that the approach to statutory construc-
tion reminds one of the limited use of writs in English law. Thus, ERISA's
substantive and remedial provisions require evaluation for consistency with
the underlying policy goals embedded in the statute. The "black hole" of
deferred and noncash compensation programsjurisprudence is not a necessary
consequence of comprehensive preemption. Instead, the federal substantive
and remedial law, or more accurately, the absence of federal substantive and
remedial law, creates the vacuity.
67
A brief examination of federal discrimination law is useful before
resuming a discussion of benefits regulation. Title VII has proven adaptive,
at least in part, to the complexities created by evolving societal standards.
Perhaps one of the best examples is that of sexual harassment. Although Title
VII's explicit prohibitions extend only to discrimination on the basis of sex,
by the mid-to-late 1970s courts began to decide that sexual harassment in the
workplace constituted illegal sex discrimination.
68
More recently, courts have been willing to consider alternative stan-
dards in gauging the effect of alleged harassment on the working environ-
ring to ERISA preemption as "morass serv[ing] as the stage for a theater of the absurd"); Coni-
son, supra note 128, at 623 (stating that "current law is based on flawed assumptions").
163. See Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1991) (Doggett,
J., concurring) (worrying that ERISA's continuing expansion will "preempt everything in its
meandering path" (quoting Jordan, 694 F. Supp. at 835)).
164. See District ofColumbiav. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 n.3 (1992)
(Stevens, J. dissenting) (noting that LEXIS contained more than 2800 cases addressing ERISA
preemption).
165. See Cathey, 805 S.W.2d at 392 (Doggett, J., concurring) (calling ERISA preemption
"black hole"); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants'Rights
by Expanding the Federal Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671,674 (1994).
166. See, e.g., Andrews-Clarkev. Travelers Ins. Co., Civ. No. 97-10191-WGY, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17390, at *15 (D. Mass. Oct. 30, 1997).
167. See id. at *21-26.
168. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 994-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Bus.
Prod., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654, 657-61 (D.D.C. 1976), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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ment.69 The argument is not that the anti-discrimination jurisprudence per-
fectly reflected the underlying policies of Title VII. 171 Rather, the argument
is that in some contexts courts have looked beyond the narrow wording of the
statute and have recognized claims that arguably are consistent with the goals
of non-discrimination undergirding Title VII.171 These interpretative efforts
have been applied to legislation which intends to guarantee minimum
protections but which leaves the field open for additional state level pro-
scriptions.
In contrast, ERISA comprehensively displaces state laws that "relate to"
a benefit plan. Thus, any failures in legislative efficacy at the federal level
theoretically will not be offset at the state level. Once displacement of state
law is complete, the preeminent consideration becomes the scope of the appli-
cable federal substantive provisions. In the field of employee benefit
programs, an initial survey would not lead one to question the encyclopedic
nature of the regulation. As enacted, ERISA comprised 208 pages of text. 72
Since then, Congress has not neglected it. Rather, Congress has amended
ERISA almost every single year."7
169. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting "reasonable
woman" standard). But see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The contro-
versy over the reasonable woman standard has engendered a voluminous debate in academic
literature. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet
Title VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2370 (1994); Jane L. Dolkart,
Hostile Environment Harassment: Equality, Objectivity, and the Shaping ofLegal Standards,
43 EMoRYL.J. 151,161-67 (1994); Gillian K. Hadfield, Rational Women: A Testfor Sex-Based
Harassment, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1995).
170. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (modifying line of
Supreme Court decisions).
171. RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 357-60 (1992) (arguing that prohibiting sexual harassment exceeds
mandate of Title VII).
172. See HISTORY, supra note 108, at 4836-5043 (providing text of final bill).
173. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755;
Retirement Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 5012; Pension Annuitants
Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-401, 108 Stat. 4172; Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416; Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-318, 106 Stat. 290; Tax Extension Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-227, 105 Stat.
1686; Rural Telephone Cooperative Associations ERISA Amendments Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-89, 105 Stat. 446; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388; Debt Limit Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 101-140, 103 Stat. 830 (1989); Technical
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,102 Stat. 3342; Pension Protec-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-33 (1987); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100
Stat 1874; Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100
Stat. 82; Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426; Deficit Reduction
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494; Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
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The applicable jurisprudence has rendered illusory the apparent breadth
of many of the statutory provisions. For example, the remedial section
enumerates several causes of action, confers standing on a variety of potential
plaintiffs, and permits the recovery of an array of remedies, including legal
fees. 74 In spite of expectations that the judicial system would develop a
federal common law to supplement ERISA's specific provisions," the
remedial provisions have been used effectively as a shield in addition to their
intended role as a sword against apparent wrongdoing. Even in the case of a
bad faith denial of benefits, insurers are liable only for the amount of benefits
improperly denied; courts have foreclosed actions for extracontractual and
punitive damages. 76 Nor does this limitation on recoveries operate only to
preclude or limit claims by benefit program participants or beneficiaries. The
lack of any available remedy may prevent a plan sponsor from exerting rights
against an insurer.'77 The DOL has expressed concern with the extent to
which remedial limitations impinge upon its enforcement actions. 7
The federalization of benefit-related claims leaves numerous would-be
plaintiffs without legal recourse. This result is far from unheard of in the law,
and neoclassical economists frequently argue in favor of a laissez-faire
approach to employment arrangements. 79  Another federal employment-
related statute provides a good example of a purposeful regulatory vacuum.
Application of traditional preemption doctrine means that the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) preempts state regulation of conduct that it arguably
protects or prohibits.' In addition, traditional doctrine results in the nullifi-
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324; Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
34, 95 Stat. 172.
174. ERISA§ 502,29U.S.C.§ 1132(1994).
175. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) ("[W]e have held
that courts are to develop a 'federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regu-
lated plans."' (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987), superceded by
statute as stated in Hunter v. Ameritech, 779 F. Supp. 419, 421 (N.D. I11. 991)); 120 CONG.
REC. 29,942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits) ("[A] body of Federal substantive law will be
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private
welfare and pension plans."); Zanglein, supra note 165, at 677-79.
176. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 257-59 (1993); Massachusetts Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985); Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care
Claimants: PracticalAssessment ofa Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHio ST. L.J.
723,727-34 (1994). For a detailed discussion of the remedial problems that may flow from the
Mertens decision, see Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compro-
mise?, 81 IOwA L. REv. 1, 30-46 (1995).
177. See, e.g., Buckley Dement, Inc. v. Travelers Plan Adm'rs Inc., 39 F.3d 784,785 (7th
Cir. 1994).
178. DOL Urges Overturn of Mertens; Says Ruling will Hamper Enforcement, 20 Pens.
& Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1638 (Aug. 2, 1993).
179. EPSTEIN, supra note 171, at 357-60.
180. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gorman, 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
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cation of state regulation to the extent that Congress intended to leave certain
sectors of the union-management relationship to the governance of the free
market.
181
One can imagine a similar interstitial role for the free market in the
operation of employer-sponsored deferred and noncash compensation pro-
grams. Under modem theory, which recognizes that benefit programs con-
stitute components of employment compensation, it is reasonable to expect
that neoclassical economists would argue that the details of such arrange-
ments should be left to the parties. In fact, ERISA leaves the decision of
plan sponsorship, and largely the determination of plan content, to employer-
employee resolution.' I believe this is consistent with the implications of
Professor Skoepol's social policy theory, which highlight public skepticism
of government's ability effectively to sponsor administratively complex
social support programs.' However, as illustrated by the next Part, which
considers two specific and disparate doctrinal areas that have drawn the ire
of commentators due to what appear to be very different problems, the
results of the ERISA regulatory voids have been neither efficient nor
equitable.
IV Regulatory Challenges in Health Care Programs and Pension Plans
A. An Instance of Underprotection -A Failure in the
Health Care System?
Beginning with the WPPDA,"'8 federal regulation requires increased
disclosure of the terms of employer-sponsored benefit programs.8 6 Parti-
cipants in all types of programs now receive Summary Plan Descriptions
(SPD), which must describe plan benefits in language understandable to the
average employee." 7 Other disclosure requirements include provision of a
copy of plan documents upon request' and notice of plan amendments. 9
Consistent with social policy efforts to minimize federal intervention and
181. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976).
182. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 133
(1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In today's world the typical employee's compensation is not
just her take-home pay; it often includes fringe benefits such as vacation pay and health
insurance.").
183. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).
184. See supra Part II.A.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
187. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a) (1996).
188. See ERISA § 104(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (1994).
189. ERISA § 104(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(a)(1)(D).
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direct federal enforcement, one goal of disclosure is to increase the power and
responsibility of employees and their dependents.'"
Access to information enables employees to understand their entitlements
under the terms of employer-sponsored benefit programs. Employees also are
better able to conform their conduct to maximize their benefit entitlement.
For example, assume that an employee who recently began working at her first
job requires elective surgery, but the scheduling of the surgery is flexible. If
she understands that her employer-provided medical plan does not begin until
the first day of the third month following her hire, the employee is less likely
to face the prospect of becoming personally responsible for paying for a costly
medical procedure than someone who does not understand the terms of his
employer's medical plan. With this increased access to information, though,
comes some concomitant responsibility. In general, ERISA places the burden
of enforcing the federal regulatory provisions and employer benefit promises
on individual employees. 9'
In spite of the mandated disclosure rules, numerous instances still exist
where employees rely on others' interpretations of benefit program terms.
Where those interpretations are inaccurate, employees who have relied to their
detriment on the advice they received often find state law preempted. At the
same time, they may find their potential federal claims consigned to the void
created by gaps in the remedial provisions.
Although anyone who recalls the basics of promissory estoppel and simi-
lar state common law claims might suppose the outcome of misrepresentation
claims to be obvious, the courts have struggled with complications interjected
by the dual forces of preemption and limitations on federal benefit claims."
Instances of misstatement and misrepresentation do not conform to a neat
paradigm. The losers are not always employees nor are the winners always
employers. An outside plan administrator, rather than an employer, maymake
the misstatement ormisrepresentation.'" Additionally, an employer that spon-
sors a health care program or an insurance carrier or program administration
company that provides coverage or service to an employer-sponsored health
care program may mislead a health care provider. 9
The harshest economic burdens are not necessarily those borne by
employees. Health care provider cases may not evoke the natural sympa-
thies involved in cases where the misstatement or misrepresentation is made
190. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies and Plans, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 559, 567-68 (1994).
191. The DOL has the right to bring certain enforcement actions, but its meager staffing
imposes practical limitations. See ERISA § 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
192. See infra Parts IV.A.1
193. See infra text accompanying notes 210-11.
194. See infra Part IV.A.3.
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to an individual. From a systemic view, however, the effect of denying a
remedy to providers may be more serious than the effect of denying a remedy
to individual employees. After all, providers already are beset by economic
pressures including criticisms of waste and mismanagement, 19 daunting
administrative requirements, 196 and the specter of medical malpractice
claims.
197
1. Interpretation ofAmbiguities -A Role for the Common Law
Given the scope of ERISA's writing and disclosure requirements and the
complexities of current employer-sponsored health care programs, it is inevi-
table that interpretive problems will occur. From a traditional contract law
perspective, an oral interpretation of an ambiguity in an employer's health
care program coverage requires an analysis of the type of oral representation
at issue. Where an oral representation constitutes an interpretation of a
contract and the parties later dispute the contract's meaning in court, the oral
comments may illustrate the meaning of the contract. 9 ' Although the parol
evidence rule excludes evidence of oral promises made prior to the formation
of the contract, traditional contract doctrine does not exclude subsequent
conversations. 199 In the instance of expected, detrimental, and reasonable
reliance by a promisee, equitable estoppel typically would militate in favor of
admitting a representation as to the meaning of an ambiguous plan term.2"
As the state courts learned in the early and simpler days of benefit
programs, 01 however, the employer-sponsoredhealth care program arena does
not lend itself to application of paradigmatic contract law principles. The
third-party beneficiary nature of claims by employees and their dependents
and the division of responsibility among employers, plans, and plan admin-
195. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty, Democrats Still Seek Acceptable Health Formula, L.A.
TIMES, July 25, 1994, at A12.
196. Glenn Kramon, Insurers Move into the Front Lines Against Rising Health-Care
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1991, at Al (estimating administrative costs constitute approxi-
mately 24% of all health care spending).
197. Jonathon J. Frankel, Note, Medical Malpractice Law and Health Care Cost Contain-
ment: Lessons for Reformers from the Clash of Cultures, 103 YALE L.J. 1297, 1298 (1994)
(noting annual medical malpractice insurance expenditures exceed $4.5 billion). The com-
mentary on medical malpractice jurisprudence is voluminous. For one proposal to modify
medical malpractice litigation by reducing hindsight bias, see Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A.
Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias,
73 OR. L. REv. 587, 630-36 (1994).
198. See Banque Paribus v. Hamilton Indus. Int'l., 767 F.2d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1985).
199. JOHND.CALAMARI&JOSEPHM.PERILLO, THELAWOF CONTRACTS § 3-2(a), at 136
(3d ed. 1987); 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 632, at 978 (3d ed. 1961).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981).
201. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
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istrators complicate the analysis. Under ERISA, the complicating statutory
factor is the statute's requirement that benefit plans and amendments be in
writing.2 2 Courts have relied heavily on those provisions as limiting the
availability of equitable relief.2 3
The focus on the terms of the written plan have reduced the analysis to
technical, and sometimes seemingly arbitrary, distinctions between interpreta-
tions of ambiguous plans and statements that conflict with unambiguous plan
provisions. For example, in the seminal decision of Kane v. Aetna Life
Insurance," 4 the plaintiffs, Kenneth and Kathy Kane, adopted a premature
infant with serious medical complications.2 5 Prior to the adoption, Kathy
telephoned the plan administrator of Kenneth's employer-sponsored health
care plan and received verbal confirmation that the health care plan would
cover the child beginning on the date formal adoption proceedings com-
menced.2 6 The hospital also obtained a verbal verification that the plan
would cover the child beginning on a specific date.20 7 Later, when providers
billed their expenses, the plan administrator denied payment on the basis that
the plan would not cover costs because the hospitalization began before the
date of coverage.208 The Eleventh Circuit reversed a grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the employer and plan administrator after reaching in its
analysis to find ambiguity in the plan language.2 °9 Once the court determined
that the representations constituted interpretations of ambiguous language in
the health care plan, it permitted the Kanes to make an estoppel claim.
210
In their formalistic focus on the distinction between interpretations of
ambiguities and conflicts with clear plan language, Kane and the subsequent
decisions have failed to address some of the most significant issues in allocat-
ing liability in misrepresentation cases. The starting point for loss allocation
must be identification of the responsible party or parties. However, the task
is more difficult than it sounds because of the multiplicity of entities involved
in the typical health care plan and the varied roles held by some of the entities.
Plan participants as well as plans, insurers, plan administrators, health care
service providers, and other interested parties typically have played some
function in the context of a plan misstatement or misrepresentation. A single
entity may hold multiple roles. For example, an employer may serve as plan
sponsor as well as plan administrator.
202. ERISA § 402,29 U.S.C. § 1102 (1994).
203. See, e.g., Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1986).
204. 893 F.2d 1283 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
205. Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283, 1284 (1 th Cir. 1990).
206. Id.
207. Id at 1285-86.
208. Id. at 1285.
209. Id. at 1285-86.
210. Id.
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Thus, identification of the parties and their roles is fundamental to under-
standing the true interests of the parties and properly allocating liability.
After all, litigation awards will produce incentive effects for avoidance of
misstatements or misrepresentations only to the degree that the source of the
incorrect statement is held responsible, directly of indirectly, for the costs
associated with the error. For example, courts in cases such as Kane must
address the distinction between the plan administrator's duty qua administra-
tor to stand behind its representations and the plan's duty qua plan to pay the
benefits as stated by the administrator. Because the plan sponsor has control
over both plan documentation and the choice of a plan administrator, im-
posing liability on the sponsor is one method of ensuring care in both arenas.
However, where independent plan administrators exist, it may be more
efficient to hold those plan administrators directly liable for the negligent or
willful misstatements of their representatives. On the other hand, in a self-
funded plan the benefit plan's responsibility for payment of a disputed claim
ultimately will inure to the employer as the sponsor of the plan.
Finally, it appears that a recent decision of the Supreme Court endangers
even the established but narrow grounds of applying estoppel principles to
interpretations of ambiguous plans provisions. In Mertens v. Hewitt Associ-
ates,2 1 the Court held that ERISA's provision for equitable relief in Section
502(a)(3) permits only "those categories of relief that were typically available
in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensa-
tory damages)."2"2 Combining this conclusion with the Court's general reluc-
tance to infer causes of action under ERISA's remedial provisions213 threatens
the viability of any equitable claim under ERISA, including estoppel claims.
When a plaintiff asserting an estoppel claim seeks recovery of compensatory
damages or their functional equivalent, Mertens would preclude recovery
under what otherwise would be the most likely statutory source for such a
claim. On the other hand, if a claimant attempts to rely upon a general federal
common law right of action, the claimant faces the doctrine disfavoring
implied causes of action.2"4
2. Conflicts with Plan Terms - The Black Hole Re-Emerges
In contrast to the application of estoppel in cases of plan ambiguities, the
doctrine generally does not extend to misrepresentations or misstatements that
conflict with the clear terms of a plan. In such instances, ERISA preemption
211. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
212. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). For a detailed discussion of
Mertens, see Muir, supra note 176, at 26-29.
213. Id. at 254.
214. See, e.g., DeVoll v. Burdick Painting, Inc., 35 F.3d 408, 412 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1381 (1995).
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negates any state law claim - the black hole reemerges and claimants gen-
erally have no right to maintain either a federal statutory or common law
action. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rendered
one of the first and most influential decisions in Nachwalter v. Christie.2"6 In
Nachwalter, a former employee's estate asserted that pension plan trustees
orally agreed to permit the former employee to use June 30, 1981 as the date
when he could remove his assets from the plan.217 That date automatically
became the valuation date for the former employee's benefit entitlement.2"'
In contrast, the plan language clearly indicated that the benefits could not be
withdrawn until June 30, 1982, which also should have been the date ofvalua-
tion.21 9 The value of the account dropped dramatically between 1981 and
1982, and the employee's estate sought a distribution equal to the amount of
the account balance as June 30, 1981 . °
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by observing that ERISA pre-
empted any state common law claim, such as one predicated upon estoppel
principles, because the claim clearly related to an employee benefit plan."
The court determined that federal courts may only create federal common law
in ERISA cases where ERISA does not expressly address the issue at hand.'
In the opinion of the court, ERISA's writing requirement precluded estoppel
claims based upon oral representations that conflict with the terms ofa written
plan.' The Eleventh Circuit also worried that enforcing oral representations
regarding the terms of a plan might threaten the financial stability of plans by
requiring the disbursement of benefits not contemplated at the time of plan
funding 24
Although Nachwalter dealt with a pension plan, many courts have
applied the Nachwalter rationale to welfare benefit plans.' Although the
215. See infra text accompanying notes 216-29.
216. 805 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1986).




221. Id. at 959.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 960.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Jensen v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 945,953 (8th Cir. 1994) (deciding equitable
estoppel may not be used to enforce extra-contractual promise by employer to class of retirees
concerning medical benefits); Greany v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812,820-
23 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying recovery under estoppel and state common law claims for insurance
company's incorrect interpretation of health plan); Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969
F.2d 54, 58-60 (4th Cir. 1992) (deciding court cannot depart from written plan terms based
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analyses have varied somewhat, courts generally accept the Nachwalter doc-
trine, and its application usually results in the denial of estoppel claims.
226
The primary rationales for rejecting application of the traditional common law
doctrine of estoppel are that enforcement of representations, especially oral
representations, which are inconsistent with plan documents would (1) be
inconsistent with ERISA's writing requirement, (2) be inconsistent with
ERISA's mandate that plan amendments be adopted according to a plan's
amendment procedure, and (3) potentially compromise the financial integrity
of plans. In marked contrast, where an SPD contains a representation that
conflicts with the terms of a written plan, courts almost universally enforce
the representations found in the SPD. 7
Although the SPD doctrine initially appears inconsistent with the court's
strict enforcement of written plan terms in most other cases of misstatement
or misrepresentation, the two doctrines are reconcilable. In fact, the explana-
tion represents yet another example of analysis that relies on a formal, yet
nonsubstantive, distinction. ERISA mandates SPDs, and their purpose is "to
apprize the plan's participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations
under the plan."2 ' SPDs do not serve their purpose if inconsistent plan terms
are permitted to trump the representations in an SPD. Thus, courts, to effectu-
ate the intended purpose of the SPDs, employ the legal fiction that SPDs
embody plan terms. 9 This process does not become a matter of failure to
apply estoppel doctrine, but becomes one of defining what comprises the
written terms of a given plan. Distinguishing between representations regard-
upon estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, or lack of affirmative act by insurer to cancel insurance
policy for employer's nonpayment of premiums); Peckham v. Gem State Mut., 964 F.2d 1043,
1050-51 (10th Cir. 1992) (deciding ERISA preempts state law estoppel doctrines although plan
employees made oral representations of coverage); Pohl v. National Benefits Consultants, Inc.,
956 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1992) (determining that ERISA preempts common-law claims for
plan administrator's negligentmisrepresentation in spite of ERISA's failure to provide remedy);
Rodrigue v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 948 F.2d 969, 971 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying equitable
estoppel claims where plan administrator mistakenly approved treatment in conflict with written
plan provisions); Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1163-64 (3d Cir. 1990)
(declaring invalid oral amendments to ERISA severance pay plan); Musto v. American Gen.
Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 908-10 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that clear terms of retirement and health
plan cannot be superseded by employer's oral promises); Moore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (deciding that, absent fraud, ERISA welfare plan is not
subject to amendment by informal communication).
226. See, e.g., Miller v. Taylor Insulation Co., 39 F.3d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1994); Greany
Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 1992); Williams v. Bridge-
stone/Firestone, Inc., 954 F.2d 1070, 1073 (5th Cir. 1992); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d
889,893-95 (5th Cir. 1989); Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d 897,910 (6th Cir. 1988).
227. Zanglein, supra note 165, at 681.
228. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-2(a) (1996).
229. See Zanglein, supra note 165, at 679-85.
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ing benefit eligibility made via an SPD and those made in some other way
does not appear to be consistent with a general policy goal of permitting plan
participants to enforce their rights as represented by the plan sponsor.
3. The Health Care Provider Controversy
Before leaving the health care arena, another context for misrepresenta-
tions and misstatements regarding health care plans deserves attention. This
third category of claims involves verifications of coverage made to health care
providers. The doctrines which have developed in this context provide an
interesting contrast to doctrines governing the claims of individuals. The
general issues are the same - preemption and, to the extent ERISA displaces
state law, the right of the claimant to assert a federal cause of action. In
contrast to individual claims, though, state law actions sometimes survive in
the provider context. In part, the reasoning involved requires an understand-
ing of derivative and nonderivative claims in the health care context.
a. Derivative Claims
A medical care provider's derivative claim usually results when a patient
executes an "assignment of benefits" in favor of the provider. An assignment
of benefits is a contractual agreement permitting the health care provider to
assert the patient's own claims for health care benefits and to receive payment
for services directly from the patient's health care plan or insurer. In contrast,
a patient may grant a provider only the right to bill and recover from the
health insurer." Where the patient grants only a right of direct billing and
recovery, she retains her individual rights against the health care plan."
Theoretically, in a derivative claim but not in a grant of the right to direct
billing, the provider steps into the patient's shoes and acquires the patient's
legal rights vis-a-vis the benefit plan and related entities. 2 One would expect
the legal doctrines to view a provider holding an assignment of benefits as the
equivalent of the patient. In fact, the preemption analysis follows this theoret-
ical construct with the result that ERISA typically preempts derivative claims
based in state law. 3 A provider's right to assert a federal derivative claim,
however, is more complex and often involves a challenge to the provider's
standing.
230. See Robert S. Pinzur, Ltd. v. Hartford, 511 N.E.2d 1281, 1285-87 (Il1. App. Ct.
1987).
231. Id. at 1285-87 (distinguishing authorization of direct payment from assignment of
claims).
232. Cypress Fairbanks Med. Ctr. v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., 110 F.3d 280, 282-83
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 167 (1997).
233. See, e.g., Meadows v. Employers Health Ins., 47 F.3d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1995).
1381
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1351 (1997)
The conceptual issue regarding standing arises from the intersection of
(1) the statutory source of the patient's right of action; (2) the contractual
relationship among the patient, the provider, and the insurer; and (3) generally
accepted principles applyingto assignees. Courts have adoptedthree different
ways of resolving the standing issue. Relying on yet another narrow and
formal approach to interpreting the statutory language, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit denies ERISA standing to assignees because
the relevant statutory remedial provision does not explicitly refer to assign-
ees. 4 In theory, the Third Circuit's analysis disallows a variety of claims in
situations where such a denial would appear inequitable. For example, con-
sider the situation of a life insurance claim inherited from someone who was
an ERISA beneficiary. Absent derivative standing, the beneficiary forfeits the
inherited claim.235
At the other end of the spectrum, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit grants standing to many assignees. 6  This analysis
focuses on ERISA's definition of a plan "beneficiary."237 ERISA explicitly
grants participants and beneficiaries standing to bring benefit actions and
defines the term "beneficiary" to include "a person designated by a partici-
pant.., who is or may become entitled to a benefit" under an employee
benefit plan.23 Under this analysis, a provider meets this definition when a
plan participant designates, by executing an assignment of benefits, the
provider to receive plan benefits in compensation for services rendered.239 As
long as an assignee has a colorable claim, the theory permits the question of
whether the attempted assignment meets the health care plan's requirements
to be resolved on the merits and not as a question ofjurisdiction.24 °
A somewhat different approach focuses first on the validity of the
provider's assignment under the health care plan.241 Where an assignment
234. Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund v. Teamsters Local Union No. 229
Welfare Fund, 764 F.2d 147, 153-54 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1985).
235. See Yarde v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 94-1167, No. 94-1312, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25883, at *9-19 (4th Cir. Sept. 12, 1995) (granting standing to heir of beneficiary).
236. Kennedy v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir 1991).
237. Id.
238. ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8) (1994).
239. Kennedy, 924 F.2d at 700. An alternative line of reasoning relied upon the Supreme
Court's determination that ERISA treats anyone with a colorable claim as a "participant" for
jurisdictional purposes. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1989).
In Kennedy, the Seventh Circuit believed the provider had a colorable claim to plan benefits,
and thus granted him standing, because the insurance policy permitted assignments under
certain circumstances. Kennedy, 924 F.2d at 700.
240. Kennedy, 924 F.2d at 700.
241. See Lutheran Med. Ctr. v. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health &
Welfare Plan, 25 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1994); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Med. & Benefits
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conflicts with plan language, this analysis gives insurers and plan sponsors the
opportunity to achieve earlier dismissal of a suit than typically occurs under
the Seventh Circuit's formulation. However, because both approaches ulti-
mately reach the contractual issue, the end result should be the same.
b. Health Care Providers - The Black Hole Re-Emerges
As illustrated above, standing imposes a potential hurdle not faced by
plan participants upon providers who hold assignments of benefits and wish
to bring an ERISA claim. Even if a provider obtains standing, the typical
provider still faces the obstacle of ERISA's failure to provide explicitly for
misrepresentation claims. 2 In what appears to be an anomaly, providers who
seek payment directly on their behalf, rather than derivatively through patients
who as direct plan participants or beneficiaries would seem to have the better
claim, are somewhat more likely to find success in the misstatement and
misrepresentation context. None of ERISA's detailed listings of the parties
who may bring various claims243 confer a direct right upon health care
providers. Providers qua providers have no such direct right.' In the pre-
emption analysis, however, this remedial vacuity actually operates in favor of
the providers.
The leading case on this issue is Memorial Hospital System v. North-
brookLife Insurance Co.245 Noffs, Inc., the employer of the patient's spouse,
Joseph Echols, verified that its health care benefit plan covered Gloria
Echols.246 The plan actually provided that coverage would begin two weeks
later because Joseph had not been employed long enough to meet the plan's
waiting period.247 The insurance company, Northbrook Life Insurance Com-
pany (Northbrook), who also administered the plan, discovered the error by
the time the health care provider, Memorial Hospital System (Memorial),
submitted its bill for payment.24 Northbrook denied payment of the
$110,829.40 bill.249
Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289-90 (5th Cir. 1988) (determining that insurer was estopped from
challenging validity ofassignment); Misic v. Building Serv. Employees Health & Welfare Trust,
789 F.2d 1374, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1986).
242. See Coonce v. Aetna Life Ins., 777 F. Supp. 759, 770-71 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (permit-
ting estoppel where plan terms were ambiguous).
243. ERISA § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
244. See, e.g., Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1278 (6th Cir.
1991), cert. dismissed, 505 U.S. 1233 (1992).
245. 904 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1990).





54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1351 (1997)
Even assuming the direct nature ofthe claim founded on Texas insurance
law, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit felt compelled "to
enter the preemption thicket.""2 In the absence of direction from the Supreme
Court, the Fifth Circuit, like other circuits, decided to strike a balance between
laws that are preempted because they have a "connection with" an employee
benefit plan and laws that survive preemption because they touch upon abene-
fit plan in "too tenuous, remote, or peripheral" a manner to warrant preemp-
tion."5 The Fifth Circuit approach evaluates two factors. First, it inquires
whether the state law regulates "areas of exclusive federal concern." 2 Sec-
ond, it determines whether the state law claim would "directly affect the rela-
tionship among the traditional ERISA entities -the employer, the plan and its
fiduciaries, and the participants and beneficiaries."'
The economic considerations associated with modem day health care
affect this type of analysis. Although many health care providers offer serv-
ices to those who cannot pay, budgetary and profit constraints frequently limit
a provider's ability to give free care.5 As a result, even if a medical facility
has the expertise and ability to provide needed care, it may transfer an unin-
sured patient to another hospital, a practice known as "patient dumping.
' 755
Common law rules," ethical standards within the medical profession," 7 state
statutes, 8 and federal statutes 9 limit, but do not eliminate, patient dumping.
Thus, if an individual does not have health care coverage, a provider may
decline to treat that individual unless the provider receives advance payment,
or at least a guarantee of payment, for the provider's services. Where a
patient claims to have health insurance, a provider typically will seek some
verification of health care coverage from the insurer. Therefore, the health
care industry has increasingly relied upon coverage verifications prior to pro-
viding medical care.26°
250. Id. at 244.
251. Id,
252. Id. at 245.
253. Id.
254. See Jennifer Preston, As Revenues Drop, Hospitals Talk ofForsaking Charity Care,
N.Y. TmEs, Apr. 14, 1996, at Al.
255. Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA s
Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186, 1187 (1986).
256. See Andrew Jay McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the Federal Act
Against Patient Dumping, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 173, 182-89 (1989).
257. See Jeffrey E. Fine, Opening the Closed Doors: The Duty of Hospitals to Treat
Emergency Patients, 24 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 123, 124 (1983).
258. Treiger, supra note 255, at 1201-04.
259. See, e.g., Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395dd (1994).
260. See David A. Hyman, The Conundrum of Charity, 16 AM. J.L. & MED. 327, 371
(1990) (referring to this practice as "wallet biopsy").
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Given this background, the salient question is similar to that in misrepre-
sentation cases brought by participants and patients. When a provider
receives an inaccurate verification of coverage, who should bear the risk of
the uninsured patient's nonpayment - the provider who relied upon the in-
formation, the source of the misinformation, or, if different, the plan or some
other entity related to the plan? The Memorial Hospital court peripherally
approached this question as part of its preemption inquiry.26' The court noted
that allocation of risk among commercial entities transacting business within
a state has traditionally been a state interest.262 Thus, incorrect coverage
verifications are not matters of exclusive federal concern.263
With regard to the second factor in the Fifth Circuit test, health care
providers do not constitute one of the traditional ERISA entities.26' ERISA's
detailed provisions represent a congressional compromise intended to grant
extensive protection to employee benefit expectations yet maintain incentives
for employer flexibility and the development and maintenance of benefit
plans.26 Third parties such as health care providers, however, neither
received protection under ERISA nor were subjected to ERISA regulation.
Thus, Congress did not make health care providers a party to ERISA's
bargain.26 Instead, Memorial Hospital's claim may be analogized to a
permissible tort action brought against an ERISA entity by a third party.267
Moreover, the Supreme Court has indicated that ERISA does not preempt
"run-of-the-mill" third party tort actions.268
One commentator 269 and some of the other circuits27 agree that ERISA
generally does not preempt a provider's nonderivative claim. Not all courts
261. Memorial Hosp. Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 904 F.2d 236,246 (5th Cir. 1990).
262. Id.
263. Id. The defendants in Memorial Hospital argued that the measure of any damage
award would be determined in part by looking to the amounts which would have been payable
if Gloriahad been eligible for health insurance at the time Memorial Hospital rendered services.
Id Arguably, looking to the plan in this way would cause the claim to "relate to" an ERISA
plan and be preempted. Id. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and indicated that the extent of cover-
age under the plan simply prevented damages from being speculative. Id. at 247. It reasoned
that a one-time award would not affect the plan in an ongoing manner, but recognized this as
a close question. Id.
264. Id. at 249.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 248-50.
268. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988).
269. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, Health Care Providers Meet ERISA: Are Provider Claimsfor
Misrepresentation of Coverage Preempted?, 20 PEPP. L. REv. 497, 525-30 (1993).
270. Meadows v. Employers Health Ins., 47 F.3d 1006, 1009-11 (9th Cir. 1995); Lord-
mann Enter. v. Equicor, Inc., 32 F.3d 1529, 1532 (1 1th Cir. 1994); Hospice of Metro Denver,
Inc. v. Group Health Ins., 944 F.2d 752, 754-56 (10th Cir. 1991).
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have adhered to this limited application of preemption doctrine. In this
context, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined
that state law claims for promissory estoppel, negligence, and breach of good
faith strike to "the very heart of issues within the scope of ERISA's exclusive
regulation and, if allowed, would affect the relationship between plan prin-
cipals by extending coverage beyond the terms of the plan. Clearly, [the state
law] claims are preempted by ERISA.""27 One primary difference between the
Sixth Circuit's analysis and courts which have declined to find preemption of
provider claims is the Sixth Circuit's focus on the patient to plan relationship.
This focus is reasonable because individual plan participants are not
indifferent about whether ERISA permits their health care providers to
enforce inaccurate coverage verifications. Patients typically remain person-
ally responsible for the costs of their medical care, even when they execute an
assignment of benefits in favor of the provider.2" When providers can assert
claims arising out of a misrepresentation or misstatement, the patient benefits
because the patient avoids personal liability for medical care costs that the
technical provisions of the patient's health care plan did not cover. Even
where the patient lacks sufficient assets to pay for the cost of past care, a
benefit redounds to the patient. In such an instance, the patient avoids costs
associated with, among other things, collection actions and reputational
effects.
The patient/plan-centered analysis of the Sixth Circuit approach also
reflects the economic reality that such awards may affect the availability or
terms of voluntarily-sponsored employer health care programs. The sophisti-
cation and costs associated with modem medical practice mean that the
amounts at stake in cases of inaccurate coverage verification can be signifi-
cant.273 To the extent that benefit plans bear the costs of misrepresentation
and misstatement awards, directly or indirectly, in self-funded plans those
costs will accrue to plan sponsors. In the short term, unanticipated costs will
affect specific plan sponsors confronted with those costs. Over the longer
term, one would expect the potential cost of such awards to become part of the
analysis undertaken by any employer considering whether to sponsor a self-
funded health care program for its employees.
271. Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1276 (6th Cir. 1991).
In Cromwell, a home health care provider verified coverage through a plan sponsored by the
former employer of the patient's husband. Id. at 1274-75. The plan administrator paid claims
for a period of time before discovering that the husband was not eligible for coverage because
he had not been employed by the sponsoring employer for over a year. Id. At that point, the
plan administrator began denying claims without explanation. Id.
272. See Puritt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 672 N.E.2d. 353, 356 (Il1 App. Ct. 1996).
273. See Barnes Hosp. v. Sanus Passport/Preferred Servs., Inc., 809 F. Supp. 725,727
(E.D. Mo. 1992) (preempting provider claim for $800,000).
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In contrast, the MemorialHospitalrationale rejects the need to undertake
a patient/plan-centered analysis.274 Instead, this approach separately considers
the provider/plan relationship and the patient/provider relationship.275 In each
instance, the formal analysis determines that one of the parties to the relation-
ship is not a primary ERISA party. Therefore, the preemptive effect, which
the second factor of the circuit's preemption analysis otherwise implicates, is
avoided.
The focus on the relationship between the provider and the entity respon-
sible for the inaccurate verification permits a determination that recovery by
the health care provider does not affect the patient's individual rights under
her health care plan. 76 This is only technically correct to a limited degree.
True, the legal theory supporting the provider's award will be based upon
state insurance law, contract law, or tort law principles and not upon enforce-
ment of the benefit plan. Moreover, payment for services is made directly to
the provider so the patient does not receive a direct benefit. However, the
argument ignores the fact that the patients in question benefit from payment
of what otherwise would be noncovered health care expenses.
The second relationship considered undertheMemorialHospitalapproach
is that of patient and provider. The Memorial Hospital court argued that, from
a systemic standpoint, efficiencies accrue to patients as a group when the law
permits providers to assert claims based upon inaccurate insurance verifica-
tions.277 The court worried that the failure to enforce verifications would
result in providers refusing to give treatment unless they receive advance
payment for their services or are able to "impose other inconveniences" upon
patients.278 The next question, though, is how the issue of inaccurate verifi-
cations might affect the relationship between patients and their health care
plans. Because it implicates the relationship between two primary ERISA
parties, this question poses a much greater threat of ERISA preemption under
the second prong of the Fifth Circuit's preemption analysis.
Obviously, the relationship among providers, patients, and health care
plans is becoming increasingly complex. During recent years, more than 80%
of all health care plans have adopted advance verification requirements as part
of cost control efforts.279 These requirements typically surface as pre-authori-
zation or pre-certification rules.280 In a nonemergency situation, the physician




277. Id. at 247.
278. Id.
279. CELIA SILVERMAN ETAL., EBRI DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 190 (1995).
280. Id.
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primarily responsible for the patient's care must contact an entity in charge of
what is known as "utilization review" and obtain authorization before under-
taking any medical treatment.281 If the physician does not comply with pre-
certification procedure, neither the patient nor the provider may claim benefits
from the health care plan.282 The pre-certification requirement reduces health
care costs through advance denial of disfavored treatment procedures, such as
inpatient surgery, when outpatient options exist."3
Utilization review modifies the incentives for those engaged in the
sponsorship and administration of employer-sponsored health care programs.
Previously, unless they were held accountable for their verifications of cover-
age, health care plan administrators had little incentive to provide accurate
verifications. Even in the case of bad faith denials of benefits, plaintiffs
generally have been limited in their recovery to the benefits owed under the
plan. 4 However, as utilization reviewers engage in dialogue with providers,
the cost-reduction strategy means that the reviewers have an incentive to
understand the nature of the patient's health problem and the type of treatment
being provided. It would seem that the utilization reviewers also have an
independent incentive to determine in advance whether an individual has
coverage at all under a plan because a negative answer relieves reviewers of
engaging in the review process.
B. An Instance of Overprotection -A Failure in the Pension System?
Given the more than four trillion dollars in assets currently held by
employee benefit pension plans,28 5 it should come as little surprise that numer-
ous claimants in recent years have attempted to look to benefit plan accounts
to satisfy judgments or to obtain compensation for wrongdoing. In one fre-
quently observed fact pattern, a plan participant's wrongdoing causes a
substantial loss to the individual or entity seeking reimbursement.286 Pension
benefits held in a qualified plan287 constitute the wrongdoer's only significant
281. Dean M. Hashimoto, The Future Role ofManaged Care and Capitation in Workers'
Compensation, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 235 (1996).
282. See Julia A. Martin & Lisa K. Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Gag
Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 437 (1996).
283. See David Dranove, The Five W's of Utilization Review, in AMERICAN HEALTH
POLICY: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR REFORM 239, 239-41 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1993). For a
powerful recounting of the application of utilization review in the context of emergency care,
see Margaret Gilhooley, Broken Back: A Patient's Reflections on the Process of Medical
Necessity Determinations, 40 VILL. L. REv. 153, 156-59 (1995).
284. See supra text accompanying note 176.
285. See SiLVERMANETAL., supra note 279, at 190.
286. See, e.g., Coar v. Kazimir, 990 F.2d 1413, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993).
287. The phrase "qualified plan" has come to refer to a plan that qualifies for favorable tax
treatment under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). See, e.g., LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note
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asset. What at first glance may seem to be a simple state law claim for
garnishment or imposition of a constructive trust now requires evaluation in
light of ERISA's preemptive, substantive, and remedial provisions.
ERISA section 206(d)(1) specifically governs anti-alienation.28 Section
206(d)(1) generally prohibits assignment or alienation of plan benefits.8 9
However, the interpretative questions regarding the provision have proven far
more difficult than the relatively simple sounding description indic4tes.
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund (Guidry 1)2" is
probably the best known, and perhaps the longest running, case in the field of
ERISA anti-alienation. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Guidry I
began to define the contours of the anti-alienation provision, a number of
related questions remained unresolved.291 As noted in Part IV, the multiplicity
of answers given to these questions and the perceived inequities which flow
from some of the decisions have drawn the attention of commentators.2 92 A
narrow statutory solution, however, can resolve the perceived problems with
anti-alienation.293 As with the health care cases, this Article evaluates anti-
alienation doctrine in order to study the broader implications for the regulation
and sponsorship of privately-sponsored deferred and noncash compensation
programs.
1. Guidry I
The facts of Guidry I revolve around Curtis Guidry, chief executive of
Local Nine of the Sheet Metal Workers International Association (Union)
from 1964 to 1981.294 From 1977 to 198 1, he also was a trustee of the Union's
94, at 149.
288. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1994).
289. Id.
290. 493 U.S. 365 (1989).
291. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 365 (1990)
[hereinafter Guidry 1], appeal after remand, 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 1993), modified on reh 'g,
39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995); infra Part IV.B. I
(discussing Guidry 1).
292. See generally Charles T. Caliendo, Jr., Note, Removing the "Natural Distaste"from
the Mouth ofthe Supreme Court with a Criminal FraudAmendment to ERISA 'sAnti-Alienation
Rule, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 667 (1994); Michael Alan Frazee, Comment, Exceptions to the
Anti-Alienation Provision: Strengthening ERISA 's Protection Through a FraudAmendment,
10 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 317 (1988); Michael T. Murray, Note, The Fraud Exception to
ERISA 's Anti-Alienation Provision: A Permissible Exercise of the Chancellor's Powers?, 57
FORDHAM L. REv. 835 (1989); Rodger L. Puz, Case Comment, Alienability of Pension Bene-
fits- Employee Retirement Income Security Act- The United States Supreme Court Held that
a Court May Not Imply an Exception to ERISA's Anti-Alienability Provision in Cases Where
an Employee Has Committed CriminalActsAgainst His Employer, 29 DUQ. L. REv. 139(1990).
293. See Caliendo, supra note 292, at 703-11; Frazee, supra note 292, at 353-57.
294. Guidry I, 493 U.S. at 367.
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pension fund.29 In 1981, the Union discovered that Guidry embezzled
$998,000 from the Union, and Guidry eventually pleaded guilty to embezzling
a portion of this sum.2 96 The Union attempted to recover some of the lost
assets by requesting that the pension plan impose a constructive trust in favor
of the Union on Guidry's pension plan benefits."
In its first and only decision to construe the scope of the anti-alienation
provision outside the context of ERISA's interaction with the Bankruptcy
Code298 orERISA's preemption provision,2" the United States Supreme Court
disagreed with both the district and circuit courts"' and determined in
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 368.
298. See Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 764 (1992). In Patterson, the Supreme
Court decided that money held in a qualified plan is excludable from estate property in a
bankruptcy proceeding. Id. at 764. For a pre-Patterson article discussing these issues, see
Edward W. Brankey & Frank P. Darr, Debtor Interests in Pension Plans as Property of the
Debtor's Estate, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 275 (1990). Post-Patterson articles include Walter A.
Effross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving "Plain Meaning"
Approach to Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1636, 1710-18 (1993); Jack
E. Karns, ERISA Qualified Pension Plan Benefits as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate: The
Unanswered Questions After Patterson v. Shumate, 16 CAMPBELL L. Rv. 303 (1994); Jeanne
Cullinan Ray, Protecting Pension Assets in Personal Bankruptcy, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 409,
412-418 (1994).
299. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Servs., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1988).
For discussions of the Mackey decision in some depth, see generally Conison, supra note 128,
at 664-65; Adam D. Elfenbein, Patterson v. Shumate: Interpretive Error, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J.
439 (1992); Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An
Abdication ofJudicialLaw-CreatingAuthority, 46 FLA. L. REv. 355, 398-400 (1994). See also
James E. Holloway, ERISA Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health Care: A Callfor
"Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States'Role in Formulating Health Care Policy, 16
CAMwBELL L. REv. 405, 421 (1994).
300. The district court and the Tenth Circuit both concluded that ERISA's anti-alienation
provision did not protect Guidry's benefits. Guidry v. National Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l
Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1988); Guidry v. National SheetMetal Workers
Nat'l Pension Fund, 641 F. Supp. 360, 362-63 (D. Colo. 1986). The lower court argued that
Guidry's embezzlement threatened the financial security of the Union, and, in turn, of the
benefit plans it sponsored. Guidry, 641 F. Supp. at 362-68. A survey of the existing decisions
revealed a disagreement in the circuits over whether a wrongdoer's pension plan interest could
be offset or garnished in order to provide a recovery to the wrongdoer's victim. Id. at 362.
Relying heavily upon Guidry's fraud against the Union, the district court decided that the
federal labor statutes, which protect union members from wrongdoing by union officials,
militated for a limited exception to ERISA's anti-alienation protection. Id. at 362-63. The
Tenth Circuit focused more closely on Guidry's fiduciary relationship with the Union's pension
funds. Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1463. As a trustee of that pension fund, Guidry fulfilled the
statutory criteria to be a fiduciary. Id.; see ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1994).
ERISA section 409 grants courts the power to impose personal liability on a fiduciary who
breaches her duties to an ERISA plan and the authority to subject the fiduciary "to such other
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Guidry Ithat ERISA prevented the pension plan from placing a constructive
trust on Guidry's pension plan benefits."' The Court began its nearly unani-
mous opinion 2 by stating its inability to discern any meaningful distinction
between a garnishment, generally agreed to be prohibited by ERISA's anti-
alienation provision, and a constructive trust.03 As a result, the constructive
trust arrangement would also violate the anti-alienation provision absent an
applicable exception.3"' The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit built an exception around ERISA's provisions for relief against fidu-
ciaries who violate their ERISA duties. 5 The Supreme Court found this
reasoning inapposite because Guidry acted wrongfully against the Union, but
did not breach a fiduciary duty to either of the benefit plans from which he
was due to receive benefits.3"
The Supreme Court also rejected the district court's use of federal labor
law policy to justify an exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision.0 7
Instead, the Court pointed to the "elementary tenet of statutory construction
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate." ERISA § 409(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1109(a) (1994). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that this language and the corresponding
legislative history, which called for application of principles of traditional trust law in ERISA
fiduciary cases, supported imposition ofaconstructivetrust. Guidry, 856 F.2d at 1460-61. The
legislative history cited by the court included both committee reports, indicating a general intent
to permit a wide variety of "remedies available in both state and federal courts" as well as a
specific statement referring to state trust law. S. REP. No. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871; 120 CONG. REc. 29,932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186. Looking to the traditional principles of trust law,
the Tenth Circuit's analysis incorporated into the interpretation of the federal fiduciary
provisions the fiduciary standards developed in the state systems. Importing these concepts into
ERISA comported with the legislative history and brought predictability to the federal law. In
addition, utilization of the developed trust law concepts brought an analytical consistency
to the statute, supporting both the integrity and the administration of the statute's fiduciary
provisions.
301. This logic has been extended to prevent disgorgement of benefits in the context of
federal securities law violations. SEC v. Johnston, 922 F. Supp. 1220, 1225-27 (E.D. Mich.
1996). Butsee United States v. Sawaf, 74 F.3d 119, 123-25 (6th Cir. 1996) (permitting IRS to
garnish taxpayers' benefit plan account).
302. Justice Marshall did notjoin Part I-C of the Court's opinion. Guidryl, 493 U.S. 365,
367 n.t (1990), appeal after remand, 10 F.3d 700(10th Cir. 1993), modifiedon reh'g, 39 F.3d
1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995).
303. Id. at 372.
304. Id.
305. Guidry v. National Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457, 1461
(10th Cir. 1988).
306. Guidry 1, 493 U.S. at 373-74. As the district court noted, Guidry was entitled to
pensions from plans sponsored by the National office of the Sheet Metal Workers as well as
from a plan sponsored by Local 9. Guidry v. National Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension
Fund, 641 F. Supp. 360, 361 (D. Colo. 1986).
307. Guidry I, 493 U.S. at 374-76.
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that '[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not
be controlled or nullified by a general one." 3 S The applicable labor statutes
make only a broad provision' for the types of judgments available to
plaintiffs. 3 9 In contrast, ERISA's anti-alienation provision specifically pro-
hibits certain types of collection actions." According to the Court, the labor
law provisions cannot support an exception to anti-alienation.'
Even though it reversed the Tenth Circuit and did not permit the imposi-
tion of a constructive trust against Guidry's pension plan assets, the Supreme
Court did leave the door open to the possibility that an exception might apply
to the case of a plan fiduciary who breaches a fiduciary duty owed to an em-
ployee benefit plan.312 The Court specifically stated that it need not decide this
latter question.3"3 Consequently, the Court did not impugn the Tenth Circuit's
decision to utilize traditional state trust law concepts in construing ERISA's
fiduciary provisions. Instead, the Court simply held that those fiduciary
provisions were inapplicable to Guidry because the Union did not claim that
Guidry breached his fiduciary duties as atrustee of the Union's pension plan.1 4
In dictum, however, the Court stated:
[The anti-alienation provision] reflects a considered congressional policy
choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for pensioners (and their
dependents, who may be, andperhaps usually are, blameless), even ifthat deci-
sion prevents others from securing relief for the wrongs done them. If excep-
tions to this policy are to be made, it is for Congress to undertake that task.
As a general matter, courts should be loath to announce equitable excep-
tions to legislative requirements or prohibitions that are unqualified by the
statutory text. The creation of such exceptions, in our view, would be
especially problematic in the context of an antigarnishment provision. Such a
provision acts, by definition, to hinder the collection of lawful debt.315
To a large extent, it is the sweep of this general language that has been the
subject of continuing controversy.
2. The Progeny
a. The Fiduciary Analysis
The question explicitly unanswered by the Supreme Court in Guidry I
was whether a qualified plan may offset the pension benefits of a plan fiduci-
308. Id. at 375 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974)).
309. See id. at 376.
310. See id.
311. Id. at 375-76.
312. 1d at373.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 375-76.
315. Id. at376.
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ary who breaches a duty to the plan.3 6 A comparison of the decided cases
reveals a consistent fact pattern. First, a participant in a qualified pension
plan, who is also a fiduciary of the plan, has breached a fiduciary duty to the
plan. Second, the plan has obtained, or is in the process of obtaining, ajudg-
ment against the plan fiduciary. Third, the plan attempts to offset the partici-
pant's plan benefits againstthe amount owedto the plan underthejudgment 17
The consistencies in the fact patterns have not resulted in the develop-
ment of equivalently consistent doctrine to deal with the issue. Instead, the
circuits have split over the proper analysis in such cases, and have developed
three different approaches. One method of analysis results in full protection
for plan assets even of wrongdoing fiduciaries, while the other two typically
permit plans to reach the assets of fiduciaries in order to offset losses from
wrongdoing.
The Fifth Circuit developed an approach purporting to reconcile ERISA's
fiduciary remedial provision with the anti-alienation provision." 8 However,
it read the remedial provision narrowly. The court could have given content
to ERISA's fiduciary requirements by looking to traditional trust law, which
served as the basis for the statutory provisions. 319 The Fifth Circuit's analysis,
though, compared the remedial language of the fiduciary section with the lan-
guage of the anti-alienation provision and summarily determined that the
fiduciary section's remedial language was insufficient to preclude fiduciaries
from receiving the full protection ofthe anti-alienation provision.32 The court
buttressed its determination by pointing to the Supreme Court's dicta in
Guidry I,32 which discourages the development of equitable exceptions to
statutory provisions such as ERISA's anti-alienation clause."z To the extent
that the statute's remedial provisions for fiduciary breach are inconsistent with
the anti-alienation clause, a limitation on application of the anti-alienation
protections to fiduciaries becomes far more than an equitable exception.
316. Id. at 373. Recent legislation gave pension plans the right to offset certain benefits in
limited circumstances. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1502, 111 Stat.
788, 1058-86 (1997).
317. See infra Part IV.B.2.a. (discussing Coarv. Kazimir, 990 F.2d 1413 (3rd Cir. 1993),
Herberger v. Shanbaum, 897 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1990) and Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard
Ltd., 815 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
318. Herberger v. Shanbaum, 897 F.2d 801, 803-04 (5th Cir. 1990). On three different
occasions Theodore Shanbaum was accused of improprieties against a pension plan of which
he had once been a trustee. Id. at 801-02. Although the plan obtained judgments or consent
decrees totaling more than $3 million against Shanbaum, the Fifth Circuit forbade any recovery
by the plan against his benefits. Id. at 804.
319. See infra text accompanying note 334.
320. Herberger, 897 F.2d at 804.
321. See supra text accompanying note 315.
322. Herberger, 897 F.2d at 803-04.
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Furthermore, as Part V will show, the court's decision to elevate the anti-
alienation provision over the preemption provision fails to account for the true
interests of the parties.3"
A second approach, based on formal and artificial distinctions, was
developed by the Third Circuit in Coar v. Kazimir.324 In Coar, a pension fund
offset the benefits of a plan fiduciary against more than $121 million in
judgments obtained against that fiduciary.3" The Third Circuit majority
distinguished Guidry I on the basis that an internal plan offset differs from a
garnishment by a third party.326 As discussed above, in Guidry Ithe Supreme
Court decided that no substantial difference existed between the constructive
trust sought by the Union and a garnishment, which was generally agreed to
be prohibited by ERISA's anti-alienation provision.327 Both involve a trian-
gular relationship where a debt owed by one person to another is collected
from funds held by a third person. The Third Circuit ruled that offsets differ
substantially from this kind of triangular relationship because offsets are two-
party transactions, involving only the debtor and creditor.32 As a result, the
Coar majority concluded that the kind of offset made by the pension plan was
"simply not an alienation within section 206(d)(1). 329
323. See infra Part V.
324. 990 F.2d 1413 (3d Cir. 1993).
325. Coar v. Kazimir, 990 F.2d 1413, 1414 (3d Cir. 1993). Robert Coarhad been atrustee
of the Pension Fund of Mid-Jersey Trucking Local 701 (Pension Fund). Id. at 1414. The
Pension Fund obtained two judgments against Coar: one judgment of more than $25 million
for violations of his ERISA fiduciary duties and a second of more than $96 million for non-
ERISA malfeasance. Id. at 1413-15. Coar sued, unsuccessfully, to prevent the Pension Fund
from offsetting his plan benefits against his liabilities to the Pension Fund. Id. at 1414-15.
326. See id. at 1420-22.
327. See supra text accompanying note 303.
328. Coar, 990 F.2d at 1420-22. The court asserted that language in Treasury Department
regulations supports this distinction and appears to view offsets as consistent with the anti-
alienation provision. Id. at 1421-22. The Ninth Circuit adopted this portion of the Third
Circuit's reasoning. Parker v. Bain, 68 F.3d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 1995) (withholding benefits
of fiduciary who embezzled $1.4 million is equivalent of set-off).
329. Coar, 909 F.2d at 1422. As additional support for its decision, the Coar majority
reconciled the anti-alienation provision with section 409, which provides remedies for fiduciary
breach. Id. The Coar majority decided that Congress intended the anti-alienation provision "to
protect plan beneficiaries by ensuring that plan assets are used only for payment of benefits."
Id. at 1420. Consistent with this goal, any recovery, even one from plan benefits, in favor of
the plan and against a breaching fiduciary who caused a loss to the plan contributes to the plan's
ability to pay benefits to the other plan beneficiaries. Id. at 1420-25.
The Coar majority also reasoned that section 409's provisions on fiduciary liability are
more specific than either ERISA's anti-alienation provision or the federal labor statutes at issue
in Guidryl Id. As aresult, section 409 serves as abetter indicator of congressional intent than
does the general language of the anti-alienation provision. Id. Finally, all members of the panel
agreed that it would be absurd to construe ERISA as requiring a plan to make pension payments
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Although attractive in its outcome, the Coar analysis is not doctrinally
sound. Its overly technical focus is likely to engender future interpretative
problems and inconsistent application. Under Coar's reasoning, it should not
matter whether ERISA's fiduciary recovery section, a violation of some other
ERISA provision, or even a violation of another state or federal law provides
the basis for the judgment being offset. The only determinant, under this
analysis, should be whether the harm ran against the plan, thereby retaining
the character of the recovery as an offset, as opposed to resulting in a trian-
gular relationship such as a garnishment. In fact, at least to the extent that
nonfiduciaries can cause harm to a plan, the reasoning should permit the offset
of benefits of any plan participant and not be limited to the benefits of plan
fiduciaries.
In addition, the distinction between two-party and three-party recoveries
elevates form over substance and fails to recognize the realities of funding
defined benefit pension plans. Because the plan sponsor must make contribu-
tions to a defined benefit plan sufficient to fund the promised benefits, it is
likely to be the plan sponsor that eventually bears the cost, in the form of
increased plan contributions, of any unreimbursed harm done to such a plan.330
The oddity of the Coat-rationale is that ifa wrongdoing fiduciary causes harm
to a defined benefit plan, the ability to offset the fiduciary's benefits ulti-
mately protects the sponsoring employer from having to make good the loss.
However, if a fiduciary causes harm directly to his employer, Guidry I pre-
cludes the employer from recovering against the fiduciary's plan benefits.33'
Thus, an employer who has been harmed directly has fewer rights than an
employer who has been harmed indirectly. In this way, the result appears
somewhat inapposite to the Third Circuit's focus on, and desire to draw a dis-
tinction between, direct and indirect recoveries.
A third alternative avoids both the narrow reading of the Fifth Circuit and
the doctrinally questionable logic of Coar's offset rationale. Given the fiduci-
to a plan fiduciary who had been found guilty of causing millions of dollars in plan losses. Id.
at 1420-25.
In order to address the Guidry 1Court's concern about proliferating exceptions to the anti-
alienation provision, the Coar majority pointed out that ERISA fiduciaries constitute a some-
what narrow, well-defined class. Id. Thus, only a limited number of plan participants would
be subject to this "exception" to the anti-alienation provision. Id. at 1422. However, ERISA's
functional analysis makes it relatively easy for a plan actor to become a fiduciary, and unlike
the traditional trust, a single benefit plan typically will have a number of fiduciaries. See Muir,
supra note 176, at 14-15.
330. An exception would occur if, in lieu ofthe wrongdoing, the plan sponsor would have
increased plan benefits. In this situation, the plan participants bear the burden of the wrong-
doing because, in the absence of the wrongdoing, the plan participants would have received
higher benefits. For a more detailed explanation of the differences in risk allocation between
defined benefit and defined contribution plans see Muir, supra note 115, at 205.
331. See supra notes 299-306 and accompanying text (discussing Guidry 1).
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ary nature of the breaches in these instances, ERISA's specialized fiduciary
recovery provision becomes relevant to any determination.332 Legislative
history strongly supports the use of established trust law fiduciary principles
in construing those provisions.33 In turn, traditional trust law concepts permit
impounding the share of a trustee who also is a trust beneficiary to offset any
fiduciary breach by the trustee
34
The anti-alienation provision does not necessarily abrogate the equitable
power of the courts to protect the plan trust and to prevent wrongdoers from
benefitting at the expense of the trust and the other beneficiaries. 35 Other
anti-alienation exceptions derived from state law have developed. For exam-
ple, the majority of courts addressing the issue during ERISA's early years
permitted ex-spouses to garnish pension plan benefits to satisfy spousal and
family support judgments. 6 These courts reasoned that, although a techni-
cal reading of the statute might indicate otherwise, Congress did not intend
ERISA to preclude enforcement of state court orders for spousal maintenance
or child support.
337
From the perspectives of both doctrine and policy, this rationale, based
upon ERISA's fiduciary provisions, is more sound than the other two ap-
proaches. Doctrinally, because it is grounded in statutory language, such a
rationale avoids Guidry Ps distrust ofjudicially created, purely equitable ex-
ceptions to statutory provisions. The resulting limitation on anti-alienation
protection is both narrow and, with the constraint of having to define who is
an ERISA fiduciary, reasonably easy to apply. Permitting plans to offset the
benefits of a breaching fiduciary also accords with ERISA's policy of pro-
viding plans with broad protections against and remedies for fiduciary viola-
tions.
332. See Crawford v. La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 119-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Solmsen, 743 F. Supp. 125, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
(adopting logic of Coar in case of breaching fiduciary).
333. Crawford, 815 F.2d at 119-20.
334. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 257 (1959); GEoRGE G. BOGERT&
GEORGET. BOGERT,THELAWOFTRUSTsANDTRUSTEES § 191 (Rev. 2d ed. 1977); AUSTINW.
SCOTT & WiLLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 257 (4th ed. 1987).
335. See Crawford, 815 F.2d at 121-22.
336. See Operating Eng'rs' Local No. 428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zambrosky, 650 F.2d
196, 200 (9th Cir. 1981).
337. See id. at 200-02. The courts also justified enforcement of such state court orders by
pointing to ERISA's purpose of ensuring that plan assets be used for the benefit of participants
and their beneficiaries. See id. However, a few courts took a plain meaning approach to
interpreting the statute and denied such garnishments on the basis that they violated ERISA's
anti-alienation provision. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Townsend, 468 F. Supp. 466,469
(E.D. Mich. 1976). Ultimately, Congress resolved the issue by granting divorcing individuals
an explicit statutory basis upon which to seek pension plan assets held on behalf of a spouse.
ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1994).
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Furthermore, by avoiding the artificial distinctions made by the offset
rationale of the Third Circuit, an analytical approach founded on ERISA's
fiduciary provisions rules out offsets against the benefits of nonfiduciaries or
against any wrongdoer whose harm to the plan did not conform to the rela-
tively narrow paradigm of a fiduciary breach. At the same time, the fiduciary
analysis avoids the overly narrow approach of the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth
Circuit's reasoning results in the protection of the pension plan benefits of
breaching fiduciaries despiteERISA's explicit provision that breaching fiduci-
aries may be held personally liable for losses caused by their wrongdoing.
Such extensive protections discourage plan sponsorship and fail to incentivize
against fiduciary breach.
b. Nonfiduciary Wrongdoing
Until recently, it appeared that developing doctrine would uniformly
permit a judgment creditor to reach the benefits of a nonfiduciary once the
funds had been paid out of a qualified plan. 38 As with, the fiduciary cases,
these nonfiduciary wrongdoing cases conform to a common factual outline.
First, a plan beneficiary causes some kind of monetary harm - to a union of
which he was a fiduciary, to the plan itself, or to innocent investors.339
Second, the party who experiences a loss attempts to capture the wrongdoer's
pension benefits after the plan pays the benefits to the wrongdoer. 4 ° The
method of attempted recovery may vary slightly - using, as alternatives,
garnishment, writ of execution, or court-ordered restitution.
After losing in its effort to obtain a constructive trust over Curtis
Guidry's pension benefits held by qualified plans, the Union sought to garnish
Guidry's bank account into which the plan benefits were paid on a periodic
basis.341 The Tenth Circuit, in Guidr v. Sheet Metal Workers International
Ass 'n Local No. 9 (Guidry 1),342 held that ERISA's anti-alienation provision
did not preclude this type of garnishment.34 3 In an en banc decision, the Tenth
338. See infra text accompanying notes 343-45.
339. United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 681-82 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding fraudulent real
estate schemes harmed innocent investors); Trucking Employees ofN. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc.
v. Colville, 16 F.3d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting excess disability benefits paid); Guidry 1, 493
U.S. 365, 367 (1990), appeal after remand, 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 1993), modified on reh 'g,
39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995) (noting union
fiduciary embezzled).
340. As discussed above, the remedy of constructive trust directly against plan assets is
unavailable after Guidry L See supra Part III.B. 1.
341. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local No. 9, 10 F.3d 700, 704 (10th Cir.
1993) [hereinafter Guidryfl], modfiedon reh'g, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995).
342. 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 1993).
343. Guidry1, 10 F.3d 700, 716-17 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995).
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Circuit upheld this portion of the Guidry II decision in Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers National Pension Fund (Guidry III)?' The Third Circuit also per-
mits garnishment of benefits once the benefits have been paid. a5
In a third nonfiduciary case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reached a different outcome. In United States v. Smith346 Dr.
Charles Smith was indicted on six counts of mail and wire fraud stemming
from solicitation of investments in fraudulent real estate schemes.4 7 To settle
the charges, Smith entered into a plea agreement that required him to serve a
prison sentence and contained a recommendation that the district court order
restitution. 4 Consistent with the plea agreement and the recommendation of
a presentence report, the district court ordered Smith to make restitution as he
received pension benefits for a period of five years after his release from
prison.349 Over a strenuous dissent,350 the Fourth Circuit vacated the district
court's restitution order, stating that the order violated ERISA's anti-aliena-
tion clause."' The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for a revised restitution
order that would "leav[e] Smith's ERISA-protected benefits in his posses-
sion.,
352
The key to understanding the doctrinal disagreement between the Tenth
and Third Circuits and the Fourth Circuit lies in their differing approaches to
the relevant statutes and, in one method of analysis, the imposition of artificial
distinctions. The Tenth and Third Circuits interpreted the sparse legislative
344. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 39 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir.
1994) [hereinafter Guidry III] (en bane). However, a Colorado garnishment statute ultimately
limited the Union's recovery. Id. at 1087.
345. Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Colville, 16 F.3d 52, 53 (3d
Cir. 1994). Robert Colville received excess disability benefits from the Trucking Employees
of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. (Fund). Id. Colville had begun receiving disability benefits
from the Fund in 1980. Id. The Fund utilized the receipt of federal Social Security disability
benefits as the standard for entitlement under the Fund and required beneficiaries to notify the
Fund if their Social Security benefits terminated. Id. Though Colville had been a union shop
steward and thus should have had a working knowledge of the plan terms, he did not notify the
Fund when his Social Security benefits terminated in October 1981. Id. at 53-54.
When the Fund discovered in early 1989 that Colville had lost Social Security eligibility,
the Fund already had overpaid $44,000 in benefits to Colville. Id. at 54. After unsuccessfully
attempting to place a constructive trust on Colville's retirement benefits, the Fund sought a writ
of execution on the bank account into which Colville deposited his released retirement funds.
Id.
346. 47 F.3d 681 (4th Cir. 1995).
347. United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 681-82 (4th Cir. 1995).
348. Id. at 682.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 684-87.
351. Id at 682-84.
352. Id. at 684.
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history of the anti-alienation provision to indicate that "a plan is obligated to
protect benefits from alienation at least up to the point of payment so that
benefits will be available for retirement purposes."353 Lacking clear legis-
lative history concerning the application of the anti-alienation provision once
a plan has distributed benefits, the cases turned to a Treasury Department
regulation interpreting the provision. 4
The applicable Treasury regulation defines "assignment" and "alienation"
in terms of rights or interests enforceable against a qualified pension plan?55
According to the Treasury regulation, the anti-alienation provision no longer
protects the money from claims of a creditor once the plan pays out the
benefits. 6 Of course, the creditor must collect from the plan beneficiary
perhaps, as in Guidry II and Guidry II, by garnishing the applicable bank
account. 57 Guidry I, under this approach, deals only with attempts to obtain
rights against assets still held by a plan.358
A comparison of ERISA's anti-alienation provision with the quite differ-
ent anti-alienation provisions found in other federal statutes supports the right
of creditors to garnish ERISA plan benefits once those benefits are paid. The
Social Security Act provides protection to benefits "paid or payable"3 9 and
the Veterans' Benefits Act provides protection to benefits "either before or
after receipt by the beneficiary."3" Clearly, Congress understands how to
write statutory language that effectively extends protection to a stream of
benefits even after the benefits have been paid and it has incorporated such
protections where it has deemed them appropriate. 6' Congress's failure to
draft a similarly explicit anti-alienation provision in ERISA arguably reflects
its intent to limit the reach of the provision. 62
The Fourth Circuit did not consider the Treasury regulation and limited
its discussion of the opinions from the Tenth and Third Circuits to a brief
353. Guidy 111, 39 F.3d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1063 (1995); see also Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Colville, 16 F.3d
52,56 (3d Cir. 1994); GuidryfI, 10 F.3d 700,711 (10th Cir. 1993), modified on reh'g, 39 F.3d
1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995).
354. Guidry111, 39 F.3d at 1082-83; see Colville, 16 F.3d at 55-56; Guidry II, 10 F.3d at
711-13.
355. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (1988).
356. See Guidry11, 39 F.3d at 1082-83; Colville, 16 F.3d at 56; GuidryII, 10 F.3d at 710.
357. See Guidryfl1, 39 F.3d at 1082-83; Colville, 16 F.3d at 55; Guidry11, 10 F.3d at 710.
358. See Colville, 16 F.3d at 54-55; Guidry II, 10 F.3d at 706.
359. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
360. Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
361. Guidry II, 39 F.3d 1087, 1083 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1063 (1995); Guidry II, 10 F.3d 700, 712 (10th Cir. 1993), modified on reh'g, 39 F.3d 1078
(10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995).
362. Guidry 11I, 39 F.3d at 1083; Guidry I, 10 F.3d at 712.
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footnote. 63 The court relied primarily 3" upon that portion of the Guidry I
dicta which states that the anti-alienation provision "reflects a considered
congressional policy choice, a decision to safeguard a stream of income for
pensioners (and their dependents, who may be, and perhaps usually are,
blameless)."365 In Smith, obligations imposed by the Victim and Witness
Protection Act of 1982366 militated in favor of payment to the defrauded indiv-
iduals and provided policy considerations that countered those of ERISA's
anti-alienation clause 67 Even those countervailing considerations did "not
alter the Supreme Court's findings that ERISA funds are inviolate with
exceptions only as announced by Congress.""36
In order to invalidate the restitution order in Smith, though, the Fourth
Circuit distinguished a prior decision in the circuit that permitted a creditor
to garnish proceeds paid out of a qualified benefit plan in a lump sum and
before retirement age. 69 In distinguishing funds paid as a post-retirement
stream of income from funds paid in a lump sum before retirement age, the
Fourth Circuit relied upon a Supreme Court decision stating that pension annu-
ities paid under the Railroad Retirement Act (RRA) cannot be alienated, even
after being disbursed to the beneficiary. 7 According to the Fourth Circuit,
the Railroad Retirement Act's anti-alienation provision was "substantially
similar" to ERISA's, and the two should be construed in the same manner.37
363. United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 683 n.* (4th Cir. 1995).
364. Id. at 683.
365. Guidry 1, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990), appeal after remand, 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir.
1993), modified on reh'g, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063
(1995).
366. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1512-1515, 3146(a), 3663-64 (1994).
367. Smith, 47 F.3d at 684.
368. Id. at 684 (citing Guidry 1, 493 U.S. at 377).
369. Id. at 683. In its discussion, the court distinguished Tenneco Inc. v. First Va. Bank
698 F.2d 688 (4th Cir. 1983). In Tenneco, when his employment terminated before he reached
retirement age, the plan participant, Donald Sweeney, made an elective, lump sum withdrawal
of more than $37,000 from his qualified plan accounts, leaving a balance of approximately
$5,000. Id. at 689. Ajudgment creditor garnished the funds that Sweeney withdrew from the
plan and deposited with his investment broker. Id. The creditor unsuccessfully attempted to
garnish the benefits which were still held by the plan. Id. at 689-90. The Fourth Circuit
rejected Sweeney's argument that, because the funds came from qualified retirement plans, the
anti-alienation provision permanently protected the funds from garnishment. Id. at 690-91.
One state court developed similar reasoning and permitted recovery against early plan
withdrawals. See Community Bank Henderson v. Noble, 552 N.W.2d 37, 40 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996).
370. United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 683-84 (4th Cir. 1995); see Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590-91 (1979), superseded by statute as stated in Olson v. Olson,
445 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1989).
371. Smith, 47 F.3d at 683. But see Jay A. Kenyon, Comment, United States v. Smith:
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From an analytical standpoint, the Fourth Circuit's approach to the
construction of ERISA's anti-alienation provision significantly differed from
the approach taken by the Third and Tenth Circuits. The latter circuits noted
technical but significant distinctions in wording between the relevant portions
of the Social Security Act and the Veterans' Benefits Act and ERISA's anti-
alienation provision. 72 In spite of potentially compelling differences in statu-
tory language, intent, and policy effects, the Fourth Circuit simply announced
that the RRA's anti-alienation provision was "substantially similar" to the
provision in ERISA.373 As a result the Fourth Circuit felt bound by the RRA
precedent. 74 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit accorded a broad reading to the
Supreme Court's dicta in Guidry L
375
The Third and Tenth Circuits read Guidrylfar more narrowly.376 These
circuits highlighted both the fact that the Supreme Court had not "specifically
addressed distributed funds '377 and their belief that "ifthe Court had intended
to explicitly decide that income could not be garnished after payment, it would
have stated the conditions under which such income retained its protected
status. 3 78 The latter courts recognized that to the extent that the anti-aliena-
tion provision does not apply to distributions once made to beneficiaries, no
exception to the anti-alienation provision is necessary.
The position taken by the Third and Tenth Circuits has the advantage of
avoiding the arbitrary distinction made by the Fourth Circuit between annu-
ities paid at retirement and preretirement lump sum distributions.379 This
distinction, supposedly grounded in ERISA's policy of protecting a stream of
retirement income, fails to take into consideration a variety of economic
factors associated with many retirement plans.38 First, consider a situation
where an individual takes a preretirement lump sum distribution but decides
to invest the proceeds in a privately purchased annuity payable at age sixty-
five. The logic of the Smith court's analysis may accord the annuity the
Making EPJSA Pension Benefits Judgment Proof 81 IowA L. RIv. 461, 470-71 (1995)
(pointing out differences in statutory language).
372. Guidiy III, 39 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 1994) (en bane), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1063 (1995); Guidry II, 10 F.3d 700, 712 (10th Cir. 1993), modified on reh'g, 39 F.3d 1078
(10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995).
373. Smith, 47 F.3d at 683.
374. Id. at 683-84.
375. See id
376. Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Colville, 16 F.3d 52, 55 (3d
Cir. 1994); Guidry 11, 10 F.3d at 707.
377. Colville, 16 F.3d at 55.
378. GuidryfI, 10 F.3d 700,707 (10th Cir. 1993), modified on reh'g, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th
Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995).
379. United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681, 683 (4th Cir. 1995).
380. Id.
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protection of the anti-alienation provision in order to "safeguard a stream of
income for [retirement]."' ' Yet, the end effect is the same as a scenario in
which the individual deposits the proceeds in an interest bearing savings
account, intending only to make periodic withdrawals in retirement. Pre-
sumably, the Fourth Circuit would not enter into an inquiry of "intent" in the
latter situation and would permit ajudgment creditor to reach the funds in the
savings account, consistent with its decision regarding preretirement distribu-
tions." 2 On the surface, the key difference between the two situations is the
availability of the funds before retirement age. However, an individual who
purchases an annuity but later sells it at a discount may negate that difference.
An even more difficult question for the Fourth Circuit arises when an
individual retires and elects to receive his qualified plan benefits in a lump
sum. This distribution appears to fall in a no man's land given the distinction
drawn by the court between qualified plan funds that are paid out prior to
retirement and annuities payable at retirement. Will the reach of the anti-
alienation provision to this frequently encountered situation383 depend upon
the way the retiree invests the proceeds of the lump sum payment? Upon the
retiree's intent in spreading consumption of the proceeds over time? Upon
some other yet to be determined factor?
Although it might seem that it makes little difference whether courts
enforce ajudgment against assets held by a retirement plan or against amounts
distributed from the plan, in application, significant implications do flow from
the line the courts draw. First, allowing enforcement of judgments only
against distributed amounts permits plans to avoid the expense of validating
and complying with orders running against the plans."' Second, plans avoid
the risk of nonqualification associated with making an incorrect judgment
concerning the payment of plan assets to anyone other than a plan participant
or beneficiary.385 Third, plans may avoid some questions about when a
judgment creditor is entitled to receive a distribution of plan assets. The
creditor naturally would like to receive full payment as soon as the claim is
substantiated, whether through a court judgment or through some alternative
procedure. However, permitting such early distributions could wreak havoc
with defined benefit plans, which often do not permit large lump sum distribu-
381. Id.
382. See supra text accompanying note 379.
383. Qualified pension plans distributed more than $125 billion in lump sum benefits
during 1990. SiIVERMAN ET AL., supra note 279, at 119.
384. See QDROs: Administrators Find it Burdensome to Deal with QDROs, IFEBP Sur-
vey Says, Pens. & Ben. Daily (BNA) (Sept. 9, 1994) (finding implementation of domestic
relations exceptions to have been expensive for plans).
385. Non-qualification may cause the loss of the tax advantages associated with a benefit
plan. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 94, at 149-50.
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tions and which employees fund in anticipation of not having to make any
distributions until the participant reaches a retirement age recognized by the
plan. Alternative times for distribution could include the plan participant's
earliest elective retirement date386 or the time at which the plan participant
actually elects to retire.
Some commentators have argued that the express goal of the anti-aliena-
tion provision is to provide protection to plan participants, not to plans.
387
Under this view, it is inappropriate to take the plans' interests into account in
determining the scope of the anti-alienation provision. 88 However, this fails
to consider the tension which permeates ERISA as a result of the twin goals
of protecting plan participants and minimizing the costs associated with
sponsoring benefit plans. Achieving a result that is consistent with the statu-
tory language but that permits plan costs to be minimized without decreasing
the protections accorded to innocent plan participants is consistent with the
underlying goals of ERISA.
Considering the interest of employee benefit plans when determining the
parameters of the anti-alienation provision does present one problem. De-
pending on the posture of a given case, the actual interests of plans may vary.
For example, when the wrongdoing runs against the plan, the plan will face
increased risk and greater administrative burdens if forced to pay out benefits
and then to seek their return to the plan trust rather than to simply offset the
benefits. In a twist on timing problems discussed above, permitting claimants
to recover only from funds that have been distributed from the plan instead of
directly from plan assets also may result in significant delays in recovery for
a plan that has experienced a loss. If the creditor recovers the entire amount
of the distributions and a plan participant or beneficiary has control over the
timing or method of plan distribution, the participant or beneficiary may have
little incentive to request early or lump sum distributions as opposed to annui-
tized distributions. When the plan is the creditor, the burden of delaying
recovery redounds to the plan.
Adoption of the analysis suggested above in instances of fiduciary
breaches against ERISA plans can prevent these potential problems.389
Nonfiduciaries have limited opportunity to cause harm to benefit plans. In
cases of fiduciary wrongdoing, the proposed analysis would permit direct and
immediate offsets by plans when the plans suffer damage through a fiduciary
breach. The immediate offset would avoid the question of delaying a plan's
recovery. It also would avert a situation where the plan would be required to
386. This is the earliest date that a domestic relations order can require a plan to make
distributions. ERISA § 1898(c)(7)(B)(iv), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E)(ii) (1994).
387. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 94, at 599.
388. Id.
389. See supra Part IV.
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pay out benefits only to seek the return of the benefits through a garnishment
or another similar mechanism.
V. An Enhanced Analytical Approach: The Argument for Interest Analysis
Significant criticism has been directed toward thejurisprudence analyzed
in Part IV. Though always in the confines of one of the two doctrinal areas
discussed above, some commentators have advocated specific and carefully
crafted statutory solutionsto resolve controversies and perceived inequities?.3
Others have advanced creative ways to interpret discrete statutory sections to
avoid the harshest results. 9' Taking an alternative approach, some commenta-
tors have recommended expanding the use of equitable doctrines in misrepre-
sentation cases. 92 More generally, Professor Norman Stein has argued that
traditional equitable principles offer an incomplete framework for the compli-
cated fiduciary issues inherent in benefit plans. 93 In fact, Professor Stein has
questioned whether federal statutory law is even capable of balancing the
competing interests underlying this country's current approach to benefit regu-
lation. 94
This Article offers an alternative analysis which would be applicable to
the misrepresentation and anti-alienation problems and to the broader array of
remedial issues under ERISA. On the surface, even the doctrines presented
in Part IV and the disputes they have engendered appear to have little in
common. Part IV.A discussed specific problems that occur under health care
plans while Part IV.B dealt with pension plan litigation.395 Part IV.A con-
sidered the under enforcement of health care benefit representations while
Part IV.B considered the over enforcement of retirement plan obligations.
396
Different statutory provisions are involved -the writing and general remedial
sections on the one hand and the anti-alienation and fiduciary remedial section
on the other. However, this Part argues that many of the jurisprudential
problems derive from common root causes. Once those causes are identified
and understood, I set forth a framework for incorporating interest analysis
390. See, e.g., Zanglein, supra note 165, at 722-23.
391. See, e.g., Conison, supra note 128, at 658-68 (advocating treating ERISA's preemp-
tion provision as presumption of preemption).
392. See Steven L. Brown, Note, ERISA's Preemption of Estoppel Claims Relating to
Employee Benefit Plans, 30 B.C. L. REV. 1391, 1416-22 (1989) (addressing importance of
equitable doctrines in misrepresentation analysis); Kimberly A. Kralowec, Comment, Estoppel
Claims Against ERISA Employee Benefit Plans, 25 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 487, 546-62 (1992)
(advocating extensive use of federal common law estoppel actions in benefit cases).
393. See Stein, supra note 13, at 94, 100.
394. Seeid.atllO.
395. See supra Part IV.
396. See supra Part IV.
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into remedial decision making under ERISA. I conclude by showing how
interest analysis can contribute to improved decision making from a national
policy perspective by balancing the tensions inherent in ERISA.
A. The Approach to Remedies: Federalism, Feudalism, and Getting
Caught on the Statutory Hook
In the remedial contexts of both the misrepresentation cases and the anti-
alienation cases, this author believes that the jurisprudence reflects a very
narrow approach to statutory construction. Frequently, the purported analyti-
cal distinctions being drawn actually are based on formal and arbitrary differ-
ences that do not appropriately further the incentive effects of liability alloca-
tion nor reflect the realities of plan sponsorship.397 As a result, what are often
pointed to as ERISA's "comprehensive and reticulated" provisions have proven
deceptive in application, at least in the remedial context. 9
Not surprisingly, the analysis of remedial issues under ERISA, such as
the availability of a promissory estoppel claim, typically begins with consid-
eration of that "comprehensive and reticulated" statutory language.399 The
initial problem in an estoppel case occurs because none of ERISA's hundreds
of pages of text references estoppel. After continuing their hunt for a statu-
tory hook on which to base a decision, courts fall back upon the writing and
amendment requirements." °
However, neither requirement directly addresses nor is necessarily dis-
positive of the estoppel question. And, in other contexts, courts have inter-
preted both requirements in ways that accord more limited parameters to their
scope than appears to occur in the remedial context.01 The exact language of
the writing requirement states: "Every employee benefit plan shall be estab-
lished and maintained pursuantto awritten instrument." 42 Yet, it hardly makes
sense to permit a benefit plan sponsor to avoid all of ERISA's requirements
by refusing to reduce a plan to writing. Accordingly, the law recognizes that
the lack of a written plan will result in a violation of ERISA, not in a finding
that no ERISA plan exists.43 Thus, the writing requirement is not always
absolute.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 379-86.
398. Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980).
399. Id.
400. See supra text accompanying note 223.
401. See infra text accompanying notes 402-03.
402. ERISA § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (1994).
403. See, e.g., Memorial Hospital Sys. v. Northbrook Life Ins. Co, 904 F.2d 236,241 (5th
Cir. 1990).
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The second statutory provision that has influenced the availability of
estoppel in the health care cases is the amendment procedure requirement.4
By definition, the oral and written representations that plaintiffs seek to
enforce through an estoppel-type of action do not conform to the terms of the
benefit plan. If enforced, the representations that are inconsistent with a
plan's terms could be viewed as constituting plan amendments. But, amend-
ments must be made in accordance with a plan's amendment procedure and
ERISA requires that each plan have such a procedure."' Technically, mis-
statements and misrepresentations of plan benefits do not conform to the usual
amendment procedures which require writings, approvals, and so forth. As
with the writing requirement though, outside of the remedial context the man-
date of amendment procedure compliance has not been held to be absolute.4
Consider the situation of a benefit plan that, due to a drafting error, fails
to contain an amendment procedure. An extremely literal approach would
conclude that no ERISA plan exists because the plan at issue fails to contain
a necessary element of an ERISA plan - an amendment procedure. Alterna-
tively, one could require the plan to be continued on an infinite basis in
accordance with its initial terms. After all, it is impossible for the plan
sponsor to meet ERISA's requirement that any amendment be adopted in
compliance with the plan's amendment procedure when no such procedure
exists. It even would be impossible to amend the plan to add an amendment
procedure. In a similar situation though, the Supreme Court recently recog-
nized the impracticality of such a slavish approach to the statutory language
and accepted a reservation of rights clause as sufficient to state an amendment
procedure.4 7 This decision stands in stark contrast to ERISA's remedial
jurisprudence, which tends to treat the statutory amendment requirement as
an absolute that effectively prohibits application of estoppel doctrine in many
ERISA cases.
In the wrongdoing context, courts also treat the anti-alienation provision
as an absolute, barring remedies for those harmed by the wrongdoing. Even
when the wrongdoer is a plan fiduciary, the Fifth Circuit's approach places the
anti-alienation limitations ahead of ERISA's wide grant of remedial discretion
to courts confronted with fiduciary violations.4 ' Similarly, in the nonfiduci-
ary context, the Smith approach extends the parameters of anti-alienation
protection not just to a wrongdoer, and not just in contradiction of policies
404. See ERISA § 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (stating that employee benefit plan
shall provide procedure for amending plan).
405. Id.
406. See infra text accompanying note 407.
407. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 115 S. Ct. 1223, 1228-31 (1995).
408. See supra text accompanying note 320.
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ingrained in a criminal restitution statute, but even to funds that have been
distributed from an ERISA plan.
409
Yet, in other contexts courts have not construed the anti-alienation
provision as an absolute. A truly categorical interpretation would prevent the
settlement of contested benefit claims. After all, any time a plan participant
compromises a request for benefits there is a sense that the participant has
alienated her anticipated benefit. The unanimous opinion of the courts is that
in such situations the general systemic policy favoring settlements outweighs
the technical application of ERISA's anti-alienation provision.410
Again, these simply are cases in point, chosen for the disparate types of
situations they exemplify. Together they illustrate judicial approaches com-
mon not only to these fact settings, but to other ERISA issues as well. The
remedial provisions have been particularly susceptible to narrow and absolute
construction. The reluctance to permit most estoppel actions because the
statute lacks any reference to estoppel specifically or to common law causes
of action generally constitutes one such situation. In addition, ERISA has
been held to exclude compensatory damages for plan or statutory violations
411
and extra-contractual damages for improper or bad faith processing of a bene-
fits claim.1 Where the purportedly wrongful termination of an employee's
health insurance allegedly precipitated a fatal heart attack, ERISA preempted
the widow's state law claims, but apparently did not offer any alternative
remedy.
413
In reviewing ERISA's remedial jurisprudence, one almost begins to think
that federalization has intertwined with feudalism and we have returned to
the "rigid, technical, and overly formal" system of writs used in thirteenth
century England. 4 The existence of a clear injury is insufficient to support
a cognizable legal or equitable claim. Instead, the claim must fit within the
narrowly interpreted paradigm established by ERISA's remedial require-
ments. Present day claimants, however, lack the alternative of seeking redress
in a court of chancery. Thus, given the unlikelihood of legislative atten-
409. See United States v. Smith, 47 F.3d 681,684 (4th Cir. 1995).
410. See Lynn v. CSX Transp. Inc., 84 F.3d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1996). Also, before
clarifying statutory amendments were made, numerous courts permitted domestic relations
orders to affect plan benefits. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 925-28 (N.D. Col.
1978), affirmed, 632 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1980); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146, 1153-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
411. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248,262 (1993).
412. See Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 41 (1987), superseded by statute as stated
in Hunter v. Ameritech, 779 F. Supp. 419, 421 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
413. Settles v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 505, 509 (10th Cir. 1991).
414. David W. Raack, A History ofInjunctions in England Before 1700,61 IND. L.J. 539,
551 (1986).
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tion4t 5 to each of the problems raised here, let alone to the broader array of
ERISA remedial matters, a revised jurisprudential approach to these issues is
necessary. It is useful, before turning to suggested changes, to consider the
implications of benefit plan development and social policy theory.
B. Remedies, History, and Social Policy Theory
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, benefit plan regulation rested primarily
at the state level, but a cohesive jurisprudence never developed. Benefit plans
contained elements of contracts and trusts, but the unique complexities of
benefit plans presented challenges for each of these doctrinal frameworks.416
Enactment of the WPPDA slowed the development of state law, and ERISA's
sweeping preemption provision ultimately halted any further maturation of
common law benefits-specific doctrine at the state level.
This historical background may account, at least in part, for the courts'
tendencies to construe ERISA's provisions in formal and absolute terms.
After all, the development of a comprehensive federal common law jurispru-
dence requires the existence of basic, underlying principles to ensure con-
sistency and a lack ofjudicial arbitrariness. Because no such benefit program
principles ever developed at the state level, the federal courts did not have an
analytical foundation specific to benefit plans to turn to when they began
construing ERISA's remedial provisions.
One partial exception is the fiduciary arena where the courts do, in
accordance with ERISA's legislative history, sometimes draw upon general
fiduciary principles.417 In many instances, though, those fiduciary principles
are insufficient to deal with the complexity of modem benefit plans.41 ' And,
as I have shown in the context of anti-alienation, the courts' narrow remedial
approaches sometimes lose sight of broader fiduciary concepts.4 9 Even in one
of the most developed general doctrinal areas relevant to ERISA plans, the
common law doctrines frequently do not adequately resolve the unique
tensions inherent in benefit programs.420
Professor Skocpol's social policy analysis contributes to an understand-
ing of this limited jurisprudential approach that developed both historically
and under ERISA 2' From the viewpoint of contemporary social policy
415. See Guidryl, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990) ("If exceptions to this policy are to be made,
it is for Congress to undertake that task."), appeal after remand, 10 F.3d 700 (10th Cir. 1993),
modifiedon reh'g, 39 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1063 (1995).
416. See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
417. See supra Part IV.B.
418. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 30, at 1118-19.
419. See supra Part IV.B.
420. See Stein, supra note 13, at 94, 100.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 46-57 (discussing application of Skocpol's social
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theory, skepticism of the federal government's ability to maintain and admin-
ister broad based social programs manifests itself in a variety of ways."
Certainly, such skepticism affects the decision to accord substantial responsi-
bility for retirement income to a regime of private plan sponsorship as
opposed to expansive social programs. Professor Skocpol's theory suggests
that the same skepticism affects the approach taken by the court system to the
interpretation of benefit plan regulation.' 2 Similar to the approach courts
took in the early days of labor legislation, the courts act to minimize govern-
ment intrusion into benefit plan sponsorship by construing statutory pro-
visions to circumscribe their effect. 24
One result of this jurisprudence in the ERISA context is the type of
regulatory black holes highlighted in the discussion of misrepresentation and
misstatement cases.4' Even anti-alienation doctrines that are most protective
of participant assets and income streams may be reconciled with this theory.426
Misrepresentation and misstatement decisions also take an extremely formal
and literal approach to the statutory language, while disregarding equitable
principles.427
The next subpart argues for the increased use of interest analysis in
ERISA jurisprudence.428 Such an analytical approach is consistent with
ERISA's statutory provisions and is general enough to provide insights in
approaching a variety of benefit plan issues. Part V.C argues that incorporat-
ing consideration of the multiple roles played by plan actors and their
diverging economic incentives into the analysis of legal issues would help
avoid arbitrary distinctions and inefficient burdens on benefit program spon-
sorship.429 In addition, a full understanding of these considerations and the
courts' difficulties dealing with the considerations would aid policy makers
as they grapple with restructuring the federal regulation of benefit programs
to accommodate the needs of the baby boom generation. Finally, Part V.D
discusses the application of interest analysis in terms of the tension between
ERISA regulation and the domestic regime of voluntary benefit plan spon-
sorship.4 ° It argues that the courts' purported focus on this so called "ERISA
policy analysis to ERISA jurisprudence).
422. See supra text accompanying notes 46-57 (discussing application of Skocpol's social
policy analysis to ERISA jurisdiction).
423. See SKOCPOL, SOCIAL POLICY, supra note 35, at 226-29.
424. See id. at 226-31.
425. See supra Part III.B.
426. See supra Part III.B.
427. See supra Part III.B.
428. See infra Part V.C-D.
429. See infra Part V.C.
430. See infra Part V.D.
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compromise" sometimes misses the mark and that one key to sound analysis
lies with understanding the tension inherent in the statute. Again, interest
analysis could be a beneficial tool in this endeavor.
C. Interest Analysis: Recognizing the Actors and Their Roles
In their seminal article on ERISA's exclusive benefit rule,431 Professors
Fischel and Langbein explain how trustee functions in ERISA plans, where
employers and employees act as settlors and beneficiaries, diverge from
traditional testamentary trustee functions. 2 Professors Fischel and Langbein
discuss the multiple roles individuals and entities play in ERISA plans.433
They also point out the different interests held by subsets of what initially
appear to be cohesive benefit plan cohorts.434 For example, although the
courts often treat plan participants as a single unit, the actual interests of
young employees as compared to old employees, or retirees as compared to
active workers, sometimes differ significantly.435
Ultimately, Professors Fischel and Langbein advocate an analytical
approach that considers the interests of the various parties and the bargain that
the relevant parties would have reached had they considered the issue ex
ante.436 For example, judicial reviews of benefit determinations made by plan
administrators have resulted in inconsistent application of the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review and, thus, in discordant decisions.437 An ex ante
approach to evaluating the existence of conflicts of interest better reflects the
bargain the parties would have made had they addressed the specific issue at
stake and maximizes efficiency.43 The authors argue that considering the
interests of employers and employees from an ex ante perspective will tend
to converge seemingly divergent interests.439 Similarly, when the differing
interests of subgroups of plan participants are at issue, Professors Fischel and
Langbein call for recognition of the various interests and application of trust
law's rule of impartiality to resolve disputes."
431. See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1994) (requiring ERISA
benefit plans to be run solely in interests of plan participants and beneficiaries).
432. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 30, at 1117-18.
433. See id.
434. Seeid. at 1118-19.
435. See id. at 1119-20.
436. See id. at 1127-28.
437. See id. at 1133.
438. See id. at 1133-38.
439. See id. at 1158-59.
440. See id. at 1159-60.
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This focus on the actual interest of the parties offers much to the broader
array of ERISA jurisprudence. As already shown, unlike other employment
cases which frequently involve only the employer and employees, benefit
cases also may involve "outsiders" such as plan administrators, investment
managers, trustees, health care providers, and utilization reviewers. To further
confuse the issue, an actor in a misstatement case or an anti-alienation case
may play several diverse roles. For example, an employer may act as em-
ployer, plan sponsor, plan administrator, and plan fiduciary. Also, the actors
differ in their economic interests, and multiple roles may cause the interests
of a single entity, such as an employer, to vary depending upon the role being
analyzed. Existing legal analysis often does not undertake a thorough evalua-
tion of the relevant actors and their interests. Part IV demonstrated the results
of the existing legal analysis-doctrines based upon artificial distinctions and
a failure to accord liability in an efficient manner."
For example, in the context of misstatements and misrepresentations, the
doctrinal distinction that has developed between health care providers and
plan participants appears anomalous. Providers, who might be characterized
as third party beneficiaries of an employer-sponsored health care plan, typ-
ically receive more favorable claims treatment than an employee and his or
her dependents who are the intended beneficiaries of the plan. This is not to
say that a provider should always be left without a remedy any more than it
is to say that plan participants and their beneficiaries never should bear any
responsibility for understanding the terms of their plan as that plan is written.
Certainly, the notion that health care providers are not one of the tradi-
tional ERISA entities" 2 militates in favor of permitting providers to raise state
law estoppel-type claims. The economic realities necessitating health insur-
ance verifications also support enforcement of those verifications." 3 How-
ever, current doctrine permitting recoveries by many health care providers
while denying equivalent recoveries for misrepresentations made to a plan
participant or beneficiary cannot be reconciled with the logic of the latter
cases. Recall that the three reasons typically given for the denial of partici-
pant representation claims are (1) failure to comply with ERISA's writing
requirement, (2) inconsistency with ERISA's mandate that plan amendments
be adopted according to a plan's amendment procedure, and (3) compromise
of the financial integrity of plans.'
Enforcing representations made to health care providers gives rise to
payments that are inconsistent with plan terms and theoretically could be
441. SeesupraPartIV.
442. See supra text accompanying note 264.
443. See Preston, supra note 254, at Al.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 226-27.
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viewed as plan amendments implemented outside any written amendment
procedure. Where liability is allocatedto benefit plans, the financial effect on
the plan is the same whether recovery is made by a provider or by a partici-
pant. Additionally, provider recoveries benefit the patient, at least indirectly,
thus generating concern about disparate treatment of similarly situated em-
ployees. The possibility remains that the errors of low-level administrative
employees may prove costly. Thus, each of the substantive reasons raised for
denying participant claims also applies to provider claims.
From an economic perspective, given the artificial distinction between
provider and participant claims, one would expect the development of a
mechanism to reallocate costs. As between patients and providers, providers
can be expected to assume the burden of seeking coverage verifications if,
unlike patient verifications, provider verifications are enforceable. Patients
would benefit by gaining indirect enforcement of verifications, while pro-
viders would avoid the potential losses associated with unenforceable verifica-
tions made by patients and any resulting uncollectibility from the patients.
The increasing practice of utilization review makes it unlikely that those
acting on behalf of plans would refuse to make verifications to providers.
Reviewers require cooperation from health care providers in the evaluation of
a patient's condition and course of treatment. In fact, by increasing the ex
ante analysis, the utilization review process may decrease the instances of
inaccurate verifications.
The result of permitting state claims by providers, then, is that state law
effectively may provide protection both for providers, who are outside the
scope of ERISA, and employees and their dependents, who find their direct
federal "protections" to be of little value. In the view of this author, this
backdoor use of state law is likely to increase transaction costs and undercut
the force of the general federal regulation. Furthermore, it will not always be
appropriate to allocate total liability for inaccurate verifications to plans and
related actors. What about an employee or dependent who misleads a pro-
vider about the status of the individual's insurance coverage? In the tradition
of the WPPDA, ERISA incorporates substantial reporting and information
requirements."' Given the availability of the information, patients should
have some obligation to understand and convey to their health care providers
the basic coverage terms of their medical plan benefits.
In the case of Cromwell v. Equicor-Equitable HCA Corp.,"6 the patient's
husband, who claimed to have employer-provided health insurance, left his
job more than a year before the patient became ill."7 Surely this couple
445. See, e.g., ERISA §§ 102-105, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1022-1025 (1994).
446. 944 F.2d 1272 (6th Cir. 1991).
447. Cromwell v. Equicor-EquitableHCA Corp., 944 F.2d 1272, 1274-75 (6th Cir. 1991).
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realized that the employer-sponsored health care plan no longer provided
coverage. On the narrow facts, perhaps it is not surprising that the court in
Cromwell determined that ERISA preempted the provider's claim against the
insurer and employer." 8 One cannot object to liability on the part of the
patient in such a case. Yet, the plan administrator also provided an inaccurate
verification." 9 To the extent that a judgment against the patient is uncollec-
tible, the burden of the remaining loss still must be allocated among the plan
administrator, the plan, the plan sponsor, and the provider."' Where the
provider may recover from a plan-related entity, courts must consider appro-
priate allocation between that entity and a patient who fraudulently misrepre-
sented her health care coverage status.
Looking at the interests from an ex ante perspective informs the misrep-
resentation and misstatement cases. Employees and employers may consider
plan coverage, according to the terms of the plan, as part of an employee's
compensation. The interests of employers and employees align against plan
coverage for employees or former employees who knowingly misrepresent
their benefit status. Such coverage would increase the costs of the plan,
would decrease an employer's willingness to sponsor a plan because coverage
would not grant a corresponding benefit to the employer, and would represent
a windfall vis-a-vis the eligible employees.
Considering the status and interests of the parties also informs anti-
alienation analysis. The parties affected by such an anti-alienation action
extend beyond the employee who committed the wrongdoing and the em-
ployer as plan sponsor. Other interested parties may include the plan, fellow
employees, and outsiders injured by the wrongdoing. Issues associated with
the multiple roles of plan actors occur in this scenario as well. An employee/
wrongdoer also may be a plan fiduciary, for example, or an employer/plan
sponsor may be injured by the wrongdoing.
In fiduciary wrongdoing cases, proper recognition of the importance
ERISA places upon fiduciary status highlights the inappropriateness of the
Fifth Circuit's approach. ERISA explicitly addresses the liability of fidu-
ciaries vis-1-vis the benefit plans that bear the burden of the fiduciary breach,
and grants wide deference to courts in the determination of appropriate
relief.4"' Consider the interests of the parties from an ex ante perspective.
Surely, the interests of the plan sponsor and the nonbreaching plan participant
448. Id. at 1278-79.
449. Id. at 1275.
450. See generally Geller v. County Line Auto Sales, Inc., 86 F.3d 18, 18 (2d Cir. 1996)
(permitting plan trustee to raise state law fraud claim against employer who misrepresented
individual's entitlement to coverage).
451. See ERISA § 409,29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994) (discussing personal liability of fiduciary
who breaches duties).
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population align against paying benefits to a breaching fiduciary. And, it
seems inappropriate in a case of wrongdoing to consider the fiduciary's ex
ante interest in breaching duties without penalty.
However, the language of Guidry I does call for consideration of the
interest of the breaching fiduciary, and his beneficiaries, in a stream of
retirement income. 2 Here I would utilize the balancing approach advocated
by Professors Fischel and Langbein." 3 By comparing the interests of breach-
ing fiduciaries to the interests of the class of innocent plan participants, one
could reasonably deny benefits to the wrongdoer in order to ensure benefit
entitlement to the innocent participants. Although the case for denying
benefits to the beneficiaries of a wrongdoer is weaker, balancing the wrong-
doer's interests against the interests of beneficiaries of innocent plan partici-
pants leads to a similar conclusion.
Interest analysis also speaks to the nonfiduciary context. The Smith
court drew artificial distinctions between benefits paid at retirement and pre-
retirement distributions.454 The alternative analysis permits recovery once the
wrongdoing plan participant actually receives plan benefits.4 5 By focusing
on a participant's economic interest vis-A-vis the plan, interest analysis avoids
treating older wrongdoers more favorably than younger wrongdoers. Further-
more, interest analysis avoids the possibility, which may occur under the
Smith analysis, of making the wholly arbitrary distinction between lump sum
and annuitized benefit entitlements.
In sum, aversion of the interest analysis advocated by Professors Fischel
and Langbein has application in resolving ERISA disputes far beyond the
realm of the exclusive benefit rule. Consideration of the roles and interests
of the parties from an ex ante perspective would improve decision making in
health care plan disputes - as evidenced by the misstatement and misrepresen-
tation cases. And, as shown by the anti-alienation cases, the analysis also has
relevance in the broader arena ofpension plan litigation. Finally, the next Part
discusses the application of interest analysis in resolving some of the tension
inherent in the basic ERISA compromise.
D. Enforcing the Underlying Bargain
Although ERISA's genesis is traceable to the concern for participant
protection that arose after the Studebaker plant closing, 56 ERISA is not sim-
ply a remedial statute. At the time of ERISA's passage, employers accepted
452. See supra text accompanying notes 339-52.
453. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 30, at 1118-20.
454. See supra text accompanying notes 379-82.
455. See supra text accompanying notes 436-40.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 108-12.
1414
BOOMERS, BENEFITS, AND BARGAINS
the extensive federal regulation in order to maintain the voluntary nature of
privately sponsored welfare and pension benefit programs.457 Even under the
extensive regulation, employers kept the right to choose whether to sponsor
any benefit plan for their employees. And, largely, employers may select the
benefit levels of any plan they do choose to offer." 8
The result is a statute permeated by the tension of somewhat inconsistent
goals - (1) providing protection to benefit plan participants; and (2) encour-
aging, or at least not excessively discouraging, benefit plan sponsorship.459
This overarching policy has not gone unrecognized in the ERISA jurispru-
dence. The Supreme Court has spoken about the "tension between the
primary goal of benefitting employees and the subsidiary goal of containing
pension costs"' 0 and the "careful balancing" in the remedial provisions "of the
need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public
interest in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans."
4 61
In the context of misrepresentations and misstatements that conflict with
plan terms, employees and their dependents typically have been precluded
from stating individual claims.462 However, as discussed above, in other
settings the statutory provisions cited as governing those disputes are less than
absolute. Where a plan participant has received explicit but incorrect advice
regarding benefit eligibility, ERISA's general goal of protecting participant
expectations seems to militate in favor of enforcement of the representation.
The tension becomes apparent when one considers the potential costs to
benefit plans and their sponsors.
Courts have reasoned that estoppel claims represent less of a threat to
health care plans than to pension plans because health care plans are not
funded in advance on an actuarial basis.463 Although typically there is not a
specific trust fund to deplete in a self-funded health care plan, the costs
associated with a single, lengthy hospitalization can easily exceed the liability
associated with a pension plan miscalculation, even when one considers the
total present value of the incremental increase in the lifetime pension benefit.
Ultimately, the cost of an award against a self-insured health care plan inures
on the plan sponsorjust as plan sponsors bear the cost of increased retirement
plan payments. Furthermore, enforcing representations may permit employees
457. See SMALHOUT, supra note 1, at 9-10.
458. See supra text accompanying note 131.
459. See Stein, supra note 13, at 109.
460. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981).
461. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987), superseded by statute as
stated in Hunter v. Ameritech, 779 F. Supp. 419, 421 (N.D. I1l. 1991).
462. See supra Part III.B.
463. See Armistead v. Vemitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1300 (6th Cir. 1991).
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to receive disparate benefit entitlements in contravention of nondiscrim-
ination requirements4M and may allow relatively low level benefit plan
administrators to bind the plan, employer, or benefit program administrator to
pay benefits not contemplated by a plan document. 6 These considerations
illustrate the manner in which vigorous enforcement of benefit expectations
can drive up plan costs and discourage employer sponsorship of benefit
programs.
Consider the dichotomy between federal law and state law that now
exists in the treatment of estoppel actions. Permitting medical providers to
bring estoppel-type claims appears to raise the same issues discussed in the
participant context.466 Typically, however, the nonderivative state law claims
of providers are subjected only to preemption analysis.46 As shown in Part
IV.C, failure carefully to consider the parties involved in these claims, their
various interests, and the overarching policy objectives of federal benefit plan
regulation, increases transaction costs and undermines the integrity of federal
regulation.468
Consider the anti-alienation cases in light of ERISA's dual objectives.
Although even breaching fiduciaries who are also plan participants would
have some level of expectation regarding their pension benefits, it seems
reasonable to determine that they could forfeit those expectations through
their own wrongdoing. Permitting an offset against the benefits of a breaching
fiduciary not only accords with traditional trust law doctrine, but it also serves
as a deterrent to fiduciary wrongdoing. This may be most effective in small
plans where a company principal serves as a plan fiduciary. Such instances
present an increased likelihood of a breach of fiduciary obligations.469
In addition, when the actions of a wrongdoing plan participant result in
harm to a broader class of participants, it is unclear why statutory protections
should accrue to the wrongdoer as opposed to the innocent plan participants.
On the other side of the equation, to the extent that a wrongdoer causes harm,
directly or indirectly, by increasing funding costs to a benefit plan sponsor,
economic costs accrue and operate to discourage plan sponsorship. Here,
interest analysis illustrates that permitting a plan to offset the benefit of a
breaching fiduciary best serves the ERISA compromise.
464. See Miller v. Taylor Insulation Co., 39 F.3d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1994).
465. Aquilio v. Police Benevolent Ass'n of the N.Y. State Troopers, Inc., 857 F. Supp.
190, 210 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).
466. See supra text accompanying notes 464-65.
467. See supra text accompanying notes 242-68.
468. See supra Part V.C.
469. See Stein, supra note 13, at 102-04.
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Commentators have recognized some of the shortcomings that result from
the intersection of ERISA's preemption and remedial schemes.47 However,
commentators have focused on ERISA's failure, in the absence of federal
common law remedies, to provide appropriate relief to benefit plan partici-
pants who are injured by a breach of ERISA's statutory requirements4 7' or
who are misled regarding their plan benefits.472 The foregoing discussion
indicates that decision making could be made more principled even under the
existing statute by considering ERISA's overarching policy goals in light of
interest analysis. A remedial jurisprudence that rejects policy considerations
and ignores the actual interests of the parties with the result that it fails to
enforce voluntary employer promises impinges upon the bargain entered into
by employees. Such an outcome rewards sharp employer practices and sloppy
plan administration - outcomes that few would argue are consistent with the
long term interests of employees, employers, or domestic benefit policy.
V Conclusion
Although regulation of privately sponsored noncash and deferred com-
pensation programs has moved from the state to the federal arena, the ability
of those programs to provide security to the aging baby boom population
remains in question. With trillions of dollars in assets4" and substantial
foregone tax revenues at stake,474 it is not surprising that benefit reform
measures are on the agenda in each congressional session.47 Yet, the almost
annual statutory amendments fail to achieve quiet on the benefits front.
Courts are unhappy with the increasing volume of benefits litigation.476
Commentators, employees, employers, the DOL, and other interested actors
all raise questions regarding the jurisprudence. By examining in detail two
specific doctrinal areas where courts have generally held that ERISA pre-
empted traditional state law, this Article shows that the jurisprudence has
470. See, e.g., Zanglein, supra note 165, at 672-73; see also Muir, supra note 176, at 30-52
(noting problems resulting from narrow construction of "equitable remedies" permitted in
certain types of ERISA cases).
471. See, e.g., Muir, supra note 176, at 30-46.
472. See Zanglein, supra note 165, at 685-705.
473. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 94, at 20 (noting that, as of end of 1993, pension
funds held assets of $4.6 trillion).
474. Id. at 159-60 (stating that tax expenditure associated with pension plans is largest
single federal tax expenditure).
475. For an indication of the volume of legislative activity, see supra note 173 (listing
amendments to ERISA).
476. See Justices Question Whether Non-Fiduciary Is Liable for Money Damages Under
ERISA, 20 Pens. & Ben. Rep. 524 (BNA) (Mar. 1, 1993) (commenting that members of
Supreme Court have "ERISA cases coming out of [their] ears").
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drawn unprincipled and arbitrary distinctions in construing ERISA's substan-
tive, remedial, and preemptive provisions. While others have criticized the
scope of ERISA preemption and questioned the voluntary nature of employer-
sponsored benefit plans, at least some of the jurisprudential problems can be
resolved consistently with the existing federal statute.
Many of the problems are attributable to ajudicial tendency to construe
the relevant statutory provisions in narrow and absolute terms. At the same
time, the jurisprudence has failed to recognize the realities of funding and
administering increasingly complex benefit programs. More important than
the specific instances of inequities, though, are the systemic implications of
these decisions. The statutory language is rarely absolute. And, the very
complexities that permit employers to select the types, levels, and administra-
tive schemes most appropriate for their own business circumstances and
employees mean that cases seldom can be resolved by applying a simple
statutory section with a single, plain meaning. Some basic principles must be
used to guide the analysis.
One method of improving decision making in benefits cases is to con-
sider carefully the full range of benefit plan actors, their roles, and their
interests, as proposed in the context of ERISA's exclusive benefit rule by
Professors Fischel and Langbein. Determinations made after fully evaluating
the interests of the relevant actors from an ex ante perspective should reflect
the economic choices the parties would have made. Such an approach in-
creases the likelihood that the decisions will be appropriate from a policy
standpoint because it balances the employee's benefit expectations with the
employer's willingness to sponsor benefit programs.
Furthermore, use of interest analysis properly accounts for the ERISA
compromise. The overriding bargain of ERISA balances participant protec-
tion with recognition of the voluntary nature of benefit plan sponsorship. Yet,
it is disingenuous to argue that the technical statutory language represents the
considered compromise of the primary ERISA parties on every issue that
reaches the courts. Instead, interest analysis provides a principled method for
achieving that balance in the wide range of disputes that occur under ERISA.
Furthermore, increasing the transparency of the existing statutory tension as
well as of the economic positions of the relevant actors will play an important
role in avoiding past misconceptions as legislators, policy makers, plan spon-
sors, and participants confront the further development of federal regulation
in this area. Surely, the aging of the baby boom population will result in
increased national attention to this "Godforsaken mess."
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